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summary: This paper argues that the clause at IG I3 40.52–57, which refers to 
taxation of aliens at Chalkis and has long puzzled scholars, stipulated that any 
non-Chalkidian who had been granted immunity from Athenian tele, condi-
tional on residence at Athens or not, should enjoy the same immunity from 
Chalkidian tele at Chalkis; that the inscription belongs to 424/3 b.c.e, when 
Athenian law and honorific practice were much concerned with taxation and 
immunities. Though long seen as fiscal punishment by a newly imperial Athens, 
the action was connected to later debates about local honors and domestic taxa-
tion, and was rather mild.
ig i3 40 preserves terms imposed by athens on chalkis, and on itself. 
the occasion is thought to be the aftermath of Euboian revolt in 446/5 or 
else Athenian action against the island in 424/3.1 This document is among 
our richest epigraphic witnesses to what it meant to be on the receiving end 
of Athenian imperialism. To understand the terms of this settlement is to il-
luminate not only the “popularity” of the Athenian empire or the “language 
of Athenian imperialism”2 but also some measure of the legal, political, and 
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1 446/5: Thuc. 1.114; Diod. Sic. 12.7, 12.22.2; Strabo 10.1.3; Plut. Per. 23.3. 424/3: 
Philochoros FGrH 328 F130 [Σ Ar. Vesp. 718], also F119. Modern debate: Recently, 
Mattingly 2002 restated and strengthened his case, now more than 50 years old, for 
redating the text to 424/3, and associating it with the Athenian military action in Euboia 
mentioned by Philochoros (Σ Ar. Vesp. 718). I have been unable to see a copy of Mattingly 
2010a. Rhodes 2008: 504–5 notes that “The settlements with the Euboean cities Eretria, 
Chalcis and Hestiaea surely belong in 446/5.” Papazarkadas 2009: 74 is open to the pos-
sibility of the late date. Ostwald 2002: 136: “That the date of the decree is 446 BC is almost 
universally agreed.”
2 Fornara 1977; Low 2005.
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economic realities of its implementation. The text shows both the tone and 
actions of empire.
It was resolved that the Athenian council and jurors swear an oath to pro-
tect a number of Chalkidian freedoms: from expulsion from Chalkis; from 
civic devastation; from disfranchisement, exile, arrest, execution, or seizure of 
assets, without trial; from the introduction of votes against persons without 
prior and due summons; from undue delay of diplomatic missions; all on 
condition of Chalkidian obedience to Athens.3 The Chalkidians, in turn, are 
to agree not to revolt, to reject and report anyone who so tries, to pay tribute, 
to be an upright ally, to aid, defend, and obey Athens; failure to swear is to 
result in forfeiture of citizen rights and assets alike.4
Another decree follows, in which Antikles proposed, apparently at the same 
session of the assembly (the decree lacks prescript), further: the generals are 
to see to the expeditious conduct of the oath exchange; the people shall elect 
five men to administer the oath immediately; a Chalkidian request for action 
regarding hostages is to be tabled pending future discussion and resolution; 
certain details concerning taxation of aliens at Chalkis are to be enacted; the 
decree and oath are to be inscribed at Athens and Chalkis; specific required 
sacrifices are to be conducted promptly by an appointed panel, which the 
generals are to oversee, and fund, expeditiously.5 To this, Archestratos attached 
a rider: that Chalkidians retain legal autonomy over euthynai, except in cases 
where punishment is exile, death, or atimia; that in all such, there shall be 
ephesis to the heliaia of the thesmothetai at Athens; that Athens’s generals are 
to have oversight of the guarding of Euboia.6
If the oath enumerated harsh acts that Athens would forego, the decree 
and rider that follow indicate intrusions that the imperial city reserved the 
right to make. But the provision regarding taxation7 of aliens confounds (IG 
I3 40.52–57):
3 IG I3 40.4–16.
4 IG I3 40.21–36. The terms could have been worse. When Euboia revolted in 446/5 
Athens cleared and appropriated Histiaia and “arranged the rest of the island by agree-
ment” (Thuc. 1.114.3: κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογίᾳ κατεστήσαντο, 
Ἑστιαιᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον).
5 IG I3 40.43–69.
6 IG I3 40.71–79.
7 For convenience I shall use “tax,” “taxation” and similar to refer to the wide range of 
obligations and immunities denoted by Greek τέλος, τελεῖν, ἀτέλεια, and the like. The 
precise meaning of the words in this text is discussed below.
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           τὸς δ-
ὲ χσένος τὸς ἐν Χαλκίδι, hόσοι οἰκõντες
μὲ τελõσιν Ἀθέναζε, καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται h-
υπὸ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεναίον ἀτέλεια, τὸς δὲ ἄ-   55
λλος τελε˜ν ἐς Χαλκίδα, καθάπερ hοι ἄλλο-
ι Χαλκιδέες.
The nature and objective of these provisions is a mystery. Were these aliens 
Athenian citizens? Cleruchs? Metics at Athens, at Chalkis? Citizens of states 
allied with or subject to Athens? Merchants? Did the clauses restrict or protect 
Chalkis’s right to tax? If the former, was the measure mild or punitive? Were 
these tele liturgies, transit taxes, metoikion, tribute, sales tax, or something 
else? The stakes are high: the passage smells like policy and so affects our un-
derstanding of Athens’s legal and economic posture in an important period.8 
Moreover, the passage’s grammar is as difficult to unlock as its historical 
significance and has exercised nearly all who have studied the text.9 On the 
basis of syntactical parallels—two observed already—I propose a new inter-
pretation of what the grammar denotes and, based on that, a new historical 
understanding of the clauses.
***
Let us begin with the Greek. Meyer translated, “Die Fremden in Chalkis, welche 
dort als Metoeken wohnen und nicht nach Athen Steuern zahlen, und wenn 
Jemandem vom athenischen Demos Steuerfreiheit gegeben ist,—alle anderen 
sollen nach Chalkis steuern wie die Chalkidier.”10 For him, the relative clause 
expresses exception (not “those who do not” but “except those who do”) and 
confers the same on the protasis that follows (“and except anyone to whom 
8 One may find thoughtful review of past scholarship, and ongoing debate over both 
historical and grammatical interpretation, in many excellent discussions from the last 
generation: Gauthier 1971: 65–67; Whitehead 1976; Fornara 1977; Balcer 1978: 65–71; 
Pébarthe 1999: 142–46; Giovannini 2000: 61–63, with Pébarthe 2005; Ostwald 2002: 
140–41. Thanks to more than a century of hard work on the text, many of the individual 
claims that I shall make have originated with others, although the grammatical and 
historical interpretations that they support are new.
9 Observations that the grammar is awkward but the meaning clear are old and perhaps 
ought to have raised a red flag; see e.g., Ditt, Syll.2 17 p.29n16: “Haec verba structuram 
enuntiati turbant etsi sententia perspicua est;” von Stern 1916: 631, referring to Kolbe’s 
interepretation of “des grammatisch nicht ganz correct, aber dem Sprachgebrauch nach 
völlig einwandfrei gebauten Satzes.”
10 Meyer 1899: 147.
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ateleia has been given”);11 the aliens were metics at both Athens and Chalkis, 
and all aliens resident in Chalkis were to pay taxes thereto except (a) those who 
were also registered as metics at Athens and (b) those to whom Athens had 
granted tax immunity.12 Athenians who settled in Chalkis, Meyer reasoned, 
were not to be taxed by their new city of residence; and Athens sought by this 
measure to extend that same immunity to all metics at Athens and recipi-
ents of immunity from Athenian taxation.13 The grammar underlying this 
interpretation, if not necessarily the historical conclusions, matured quickly 
into something of a scholarly consensus,14 which “consists of equating ὅσοι 
.... μή with πλὴν ὅσοι, taking εἴ τωι as ὅτωι, supplying πλὴν before εἴ τωι and 
taking τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους as an anacolouthon resuming τοὺς ξένους after the 
two exceptions have been stated.”15 To put it another way: (1) hόσοι ... | μὲ 
τελõσιν means “except those who pay”; (2) this exception applies also to the 
11 Von Stern 1916: 631–32, expanded: “Die Fremden in Chalkis, welche dort als Metöken 
wohnen — (es folgt im negativen Nebensatz die erste Einschränkung) sofern sie nicht nach 
Athen Steuern zahlen und (es folgt im positiven Nebensatz die zweite Einschränkung) 
wenn jemand vom athenischen Demos Steuerfreiheit verliehen ist—, sie sollen (d. h. alle 
anderen, die nicht Ausgenommenen, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους) nach Chalkis wie die Chalkidier 
steuern. Daraus folgt, daß von der Steuerzahlung in Chalkis befreit waren: erstens solche 
Metöken, die in Athen angeschrieben waren und dorthin Steuern zahlten, zweitens die 
Fremden, denen Athen das Privileg der Steuerfreiheit verliehen hatte.” Henry 1979: 288 
follows Meyer very closely, observing that the text “may be translated literally as: ‘The 
aliens in Chalcis, as many as living <there> do not pay taxes to Athens, and if to anyone 
exemption from taxation has been granted by the Athenian demos, the others then 
(apodotic δέ) shall pay taxes to Chalcis, just as the other Chalcidians <do>’” but that this 
means that “all the aliens resident in Chalcis shall pay taxes to Chalcis, just as the other 
Chalcidians do, except in cases where (i) they pay taxes to Athens, or (ii) an individual 
has been granted exemption from taxation by the Athenian demos.”
12 Kirchner, IG I supp. 27a, emended to achieve the same effect (expressed per Leiden 
conventions): τὸς δ|ὲ χσένος τὸς ἐν Χαλκίδι {hόσοι} οἰκõντ<α>ς <hόσοι> | μὲ<ν> τελõσιν 
Ἀθέναζε, καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται h|υπὸ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεναίον ἀτέλεια, <ἀτελεῖς εἶναι>, τὸς δὲ 
ἄ|λλος τελε˜ν ἐς Χαλκίδα, καθάπερ hοι ἄλλο|ι Χαλκιδέες (“that the xenoi who dwell in 
Chalkis, as many as pay tax to Athens, and if ateleia has been granted to anyone by the 
Athenian people [sc. also they], shall be immune from taxation, but that the others shall 
pay to Chalkis, just as the other Chalkidians [sc. pay].”)
13 Meyer 1899: 147.
14 See, for example, already, Tod, GHI I2 p.86: “But the aliens at Chalcis, save those 
who, resident there, pay taxes to Athens and any one who has received from the Athenian 
people a grant of exemption, shall in all other cases pay taxes to Chalkis as do also the 
Chalcidians.” Note, however, that Tod’s “shall in all other cases” smooths over Meyer’s more 
abruptly literal “—alle anderen sollen;” also Stern’s “—, sie sollen (d. h. alle anderen, die ....”
15 Slings 1977: 277.
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protasis, καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται ... ἀτέλεια; (3) the δὲ in τὸς δὲ ἄ|λλος is apodotic 
/ resumptive, and (4) that phrase recapitulates τὸς δ|ὲ χσένος τὸς ἐν Χαλκίδι, 
which (5) are in effect also the subject of τελε˜ν.
Whitehead challenged that hόσοι ... | μὲ τελõσιν ought to mean simply 
“those who do not pay”; that Vinogradov had rightly understood the re-
sumptive quality of τὸς δὲ ἄ|λλος; that these “others” may have slipped from 
the reader’s or drafter’s mind owing to the interruption by the two classes of 
exceptions.16 The “others,” then, are not other than the group first mentioned 
(the aliens), but other than the intervening exceptions.17 Whitehead translates, 
“Those aliens resident in Chalcis who do not pay tax(es) to Athens—includ-
ing any individual given exemption by the people of Athens—are to pay to 
Chalcis, just as the other Chalcidians do.”18 On this view, the clauses did not 
constrain Chalkis’s freedom to tax (as Meyer thought), but guaranteed it. 
Several have followed.19 Whitehead was right, I suggest, to try to make sense 
16 Whitehead 1976; Vinogradov 1973.
17 Thus, Balcer 1978: 71: “The foreigners—the xenoi—living in Chalkis [except those 
who—while living there pay taxes to Athens (even if they have been given an exemption 
from taxes by the Athenian people)], these shall pay taxes to Chalkis exactly as do the 
Chalkidians.” Concessive “even if ” is dubious; see also Whitehead 1976: 258. This is a 
very common method of conjunction; see for example IG I3 52.12–13: ἀποφαινόντον δὲ 
τὰ γεγραμμένα hοί τε hιερ|[ε˜ς κ]αὶ hοι hιεροποιοὶ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος οἶδεν, which simply 
means, “The priests and the hieropoioi and, if anyone else knows (about such documents, 
he too) shall make the documents known.”
18 Whitehead 1976: 252. Bengtson 1975: 74 no.155 appears to have had suggested 
something similar: “Die in Chalkis ansässigen Fremden, soweit sie nicht nach Athen 
Steuern zahlen oder von Athen Steuerfreiheit erhalten haben, sollen nach Chalkis zahlen 
wie die Chalkidier.”
19 Smart 1977. Fornara 1983: 114, translates, “As to the aliens in Chalcis who are resi-
dent there and who are not subject to Athenian taxes, or who have been granted by the 
People of the Athenians immunity from public burdens (ateleia), they shall pay (taxes) 
to Chalcis like the other Chalcidians”; this seems to reverse prior agreement with Tod 
in Fornara 1977: 39. Dillon and Garland 2010: 432: “And the foreigners in Chalkis, who 
living there do not pay taxes to Athens, or who have been granted exemption from tax 
by the people of the Athenians, are otherwise to pay tax to Chalkis, just like the other 
Chalkidians”; a similar formulation occurred already to Lewis 1971: 16; note, however, 
Lewis’s application of μὲ to the subsequent protasis (καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται): “All Aliens resid-
ing in Chalkis who do not pay taxes to Athens and have not been granted tax exemption 
by the government of Athens, shall pay taxes to Chalkis just like the other Chalkidians.” 
Some, e.g., Koch 1991: 140–41 T4, follow Meyer but treat the resumptive δέ as Whitehead 
does: “Die Xenoi in Chalkis, die dort wohnen, sollen mit Ausnahme derjenigen, die nach 
Athen abgabenpflichtig sind, und derjenigen, denen von den Athenern Abgabenfreiheit 
gewährt worden ist, nach Chalkis Abgaben entrichten wie die anderen Chalkidier.”
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of the relative clause as he did. Certainly, ὅσοι μὴ sometimes can mean “except 
those who do” or “those who do not,” more-or-less interchangeably in the 
same passage,20 but this inversion does not always work well, or even at all.21 
And the resumptive δὲ is problematic; it appears to be unattested in Greek 
inscriptions, and on Whitehead’s construction, the intervening groups are not 
distracting exceptions, but the very same xenoi mentioned above.
Against Whitehead, Slings argued for the consensus view, noting that the 
passage shows the same structure found at Thuc. 5.10.10, which Gauthier 
had already adduced, and Hdt. 2.77.5 as well.22 But in neither passage is the 
20 Thuc. 4.57.3: καὶ τήν τε πόλιν κατέκαυσαν καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα ἐξεπόρθησαν, τούς τε 
Αἰγινήτας, ὅσοι μὴ ἐν χερσὶ διεφθάρησαν, ἄγοντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τὸν 
ἄρχοντα ὃς παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν Πατροκλέους. This could 
mean, “They torched the city and pillaged its contents, and leading away the Aiginetans 
who hadn’t been killed in the melée they reached Athens ....” Or it could mean, “... and 
leading away the Aiginetans, except those who had been killed in the melée, they reached 
Athens ....”
21 Not well: Dem. 47.33: προσῇσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τριήραρχοι τῇ βουλῇ, ὅσοι μὴ 
παρελάμβανον παρὰ τῶν ὀφειλόντων τὰ σκεύη. (“And the rest of the trierarchs who did 
not recover the equipment from those who owed it approached the boule.”) Here we could 
understand “except those who did recover,” but not easily, for the speaker’s point is that he 
went to the council, as did all of the other trierarchs who did not recover their materials. Not 
at all: Dem. 7.30: περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπανορθώματος, ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπανορθοῦσθε, 
τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, ὅσοι μὴ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους εἶναι, 
καὶ ἐάν τις ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς στρατεύῃ, βοηθεῖν τοὺς κοινωνοῦντας τῆς εἰρήνης. (“Concerning 
the other amendment that you made in the peace, namely that the rest of the Greeks, who 
do not share in the peace, shall be free and autonomous, and if anyone campaigns against 
them, that those who do share in the peace shall bring aid.”) This cannot mean “the rest 
of the Greeks, except those who do share in the peace, shall be free ....”
22 Slings 1977: 277–79; Gauthier 1971: 73–74n80. Thuc. 5.10.10: οὕτω δὴ τὸ στράτευμα 
πᾶν ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὸν χαλεπῶς καὶ πολλὰς ὁδοὺς τραπόμενοι κατὰ ὄρη, ὅσοι 
μὴ διεφθάρησαν ἢ αὐτίκα ἐν χερσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἵππου καὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, οἱ 
λοιποὶ ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς τὴν Ἠιόνα. But here, οἱ λοιποὶ is in apposition to the preceding 
relative clause: “So, the whole Athenian force now being in wretched flight and turning 
down many paths through the hills, as many as were not destroyed either immediately 
in the melée or by the Chalkidian horse and the peltasts, the remnants (οἱ λοιποὶ), got 
away to Eion.” The relative clause interrupts subject and appositive, perhaps a syntacti-
cal reflection of tactical disarray. Thucydides used this particular negative qualification 
often: 2.90.5; 3.89.2; 4.57.3; 4.130.6; 7.1.3; 7.58.3; 7.71.6. Hdt. 2.77.5: ὀρνίθων δὲ τούς τε 
ὄρτυγας καὶ τὰς νήσσας καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ τῶν ὀρνιθίων ὠμὰ σιτέονται προταριχεύσαντες· τὰ 
δὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἢ ὀρνίθων ἢ ἰχθύων σφί ἐστι ἐχόμενα, χωρὶς ἢ ὁκόσοι σφι ἱροὶ ἀποδεδέχαται, 
τοὺς λοιποὺς ὀπτοὺς καὶ ἑφθοὺς σιτέονται (“Of birds, they eat quail and ducks and small 
species of little birds raw, after they have pickled them. But as for the rest, as many little 
birds or fish as they have, except for those acknowledged by them as sacred, the rest they 
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“resumed” substantive conjoined with δέ, as the Athenian decree has. The δέ 
is the puzzle; a parallel without it is not a parallel.23
Henry found in Slings’s argument “uncontrovertible evidence that 
Whitehead’s translation is impossible” (1979: 287). To Slings’s suggestion that 
the stone’s ΔΕ might be δή, he objected that this would have to be supported 
by epigraphic parallels and that it is “virtually certain” that what we have here 
is Denniston’s δὲ “after πλὴν” (p.181), which, as Dover had described, “ac-
companies ‘the rest’ after a word-group introduced by ‘except.’”24 Apodotic 
δέ itself is an epigraphic rarity.25 But this other δέ appears to be unattested 
on stone.26 Slings posits that perhaps the “author of the inscription had πλὴν 
eat roasted or boiled.”) Here again, we find apposition, and, this time, repetition and a 
change in gender.
23 Slings 1977: 279n11: “No particle is present with οἱ λοιποί in Hdt. 2,77,5 and Th. 
5,10,10 and this passage [sc. IG Ι3 40.52–53], too, would have been better without it.”
24 Slings 1977: 279n11; Henry 1979: 288; it is certainly δέ: Dover 1978. 
25 Mostly we find errors: IG II2 908.17–18 (181–170): ὅπως δ’ ἂν καὶ ὑπόμνημα 
ὑπάρχει αὐτῶι περὶ τῆς πρὸς | τὸν [δ]ῆμον εὐνοίας. ἀναγράψαι ⟦δὲ⟧ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα 
τὸγ γραμματ[έα]; this was an error, erased. The mason may have had the ubiquitous 
phrase ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα in mind; moreover, the purpose clause interrupted 
the expected flow of dependent infinitive + δέ, and this too may have contributed to 
the appearance of the erroneous δέ. Similarly SEG XLIX 1503.17–23 (ca.250); I.Priene 
113.118–120 (84/1). At SEG XL 74.19–22 (322/1), ἐπειδ]ὴ Εὐή̣[νωρ] Ἀκαρνάν(ιος) 
πρόθυμός ἐστι[ν] | περὶ τὸν δῆμον̣ τ̣ὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ποεῖ ὅτ[ι] | δύναται ἀγαθόν, εἶναι 
{δὲ} αὐτὸν πρόξενο[ν], the mason must have had the common phrase εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν 
πρόξενον in mind. Similarly, IG XII.7 400.5–10: ἐπιδὴ συνβέβηκεν Χρύσιππον | βʹ ὡς 
ἄνδρα ἀξιόλογον ἔν τε λιτουργίαις καὶ πάσ[ῃ] φιλοτιμ[ίᾳ] | φειλοτειμημένον ἰς τὴν πατρίδα 
ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ἀ[φαρ]|πα<σ>θῆναι, ἔτι τε καὶ τὴν θυγατέραν αὐτοῦ Ἀφροδισίαν 
ἐν | τῷ ἄν[θ]ι τῆς ἡλικίας, παραμυθήσασθαι {δὲ} τὴν σύμβιον αὐτοῦ | Ὀρβάναν; here, 
I suspect influence from a pattern common in Amorgan consolation decrees: IG XII.7 
52.11–12: παραμυ]|θηθῆναι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν μεταλλα[γὴν; 53.20–21; 54.16–17; perhaps 
even 239.37–39; 394.20–22; 399.11–12. All of these look like outright errors, not apo-
dotic δέ. A curse tablet from Olbia perhaps provides firmer ground; SEG XXXVII 673, 
with XLVII 1191 (IV/III): [ὥ]σπερ σε ἡμεῖς οὐ γεινώσκομε|ν, οὕτως Εὔπο[λ]ις καὶ 
Διονύσιος, | Μακαρεύς, Ἀρι[σ]τοκράτης | κα<ὶ> Δημόπολις, [Κ]ωμαῖος, | Ἡραγόρης, ἐπ’  
[ὁκο]ῖον πρᾶγμα παρα|γείνονται, κ[α]ὶ Λεπτίνας, | Ἐπικράτης, Ἑστιαῖος, | ἐπ’ ὅ τι πρᾶγμα  
[παρα]γ̣είνονται, ἐπ’ ὅ τι|να μαρτυρίην (sc. παραγείνονται), ο[ὗ]τοι [?]ΝΩΗ̣Σ̣ΑΝ[?]. | 
{ὥ[σπε]ρ ἡμεῖς σε} [ἢ]ν δέ μοι αὐτοὺς | κατάσχῃς καὶ κ̣[ατα]λάβῃς, ἐ<γ>ὼ (ΕΠΩ stone) 
δέ (SEG XLVIII 1014) σε | τειμήσω καί σο̣[ι] ἄριστον δ[ῶ]ρ|ρον παρασκε[υῶ]; but not 
rock–solid: lines 9–11 contain corrupt or unconstrued text; this may be an instance of 
epigraphic apodotic δέ but a clearer case would certainly be welcome. For these instances 
of likely erroneous—not apodotic—δέ I am grateful to Philomen Probert. 
26 Epigraphic Greek knew πλὴν ὅσ- and similar expressions, but no extant instance 
shows trailing apodotic δέ. Where δέ does follow, its use is unexceptional. See, e.g., IG II2 
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ὅσοι in mind but changed it to ὅσοι μὴ, being more recherché” but then 
forgot that he had changed his mind so that traces of “the first expression 
lingered” (1977: 279). In other words, Antikles had a thought, but then had a 
conflicting thought as a result of an apparent expressive predisposition (the 
text does not seem otherwise “recherché”), but then forgot that he had had 
the second thought, so that the phrase for “except” resides not in the text 
but in a conjectured reconstruction of the cognitive process of composition.
A number of important interpretations as to whom the clauses addressed 
and what they were meant to accomplish have been advanced on the basis of 
such understandings of the grammar. Against Gauthier’s strong objections 
that Athens cannot have called Athenians xenoi, Fornara argued that the act 
was framed in response to a Chalkidian question: “What precisely is to be the 
status of non-Chalcidians in Chalcis?” and that to this Athens began its reply, 
“As to your xenoi ....”27 This is attractive. But Fornara thinks the first group 
of aliens at Chalkis was a sizeable population of Athenians who, before the 
revolt of 446, must have taken advantage of Chalkis’s desire to win favor from 
Athens, and so acquired both egktesis and ownership of significant landhold-
ings, and who subsequently exploited circumstances to secure total immunity 
from taxation at Chalkis. He concludes that these aliens were—not merely in-
cluded—Athenian citizens. Thus, the periphrasis designated simply “Athenians 
resident in Chalkis.” That does not seem plausible; the much simpler phrase 
would have made fine sense in both Athenian and Chalkidian contexts. 
Giovannini proposed that the first excepted group represented: (1) 
Chalkidian metics who may visit Athens for trade and stay long enough to be 
designated metics there also, and (2) Athenian metics who may visit Chalkis 
for trade and stay long enough to be called resident, i.e., metics, there also. 
The purpose of the regulation, he argues, was to prevent either group from 
becoming liable to liturgies or eisphora simultaneously in two polities (2000: 
68–71). Giovannini’s second exception could make sense: if Athens had al-
ready registered a man as a metic, Chalkis could not do the same, could not 
levy liturgies or eisphora on him. Athenian metics, by this measure, became a 
protected class that could not be subject to such taxation in both cities. But on 
Giovannini’s interpretation, a man who was registered as a metic at Chalkis, 
and who traveled on business to Athens and became registered as a metic 
there too, would return “home” to Chalkis henceforth to be immune from 
244.90–98, 1013.31–33, 1237.88–98; IG VII 3074.2–7; I.Erythrai 9.0–5; Milet I.3 136.17–24; 
SEG XXVI 72.4–8, XXXIII 143.9–13, XLVIII 1404.37–42.
27 Fornara 1977: 41; Gauthier, Bull. épigr. 2001: 152, and 1971: 66–67.
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taxation in his city of permanent residence. If a metic at Chalkis wanted to 
avoid paying taxes, did he need only to relocate to Athens long enough to be 
registered as a metic, and then to return to Chalkis, thereafter to be immune? 
This cannot be right. Moreover, the practical hurdles involved with extract-
ing money from an absent metic, who likely owned no real assets in either 
city, are considerable.28 Perhaps more problematic, any non-Chalkidian with 
a permanent residence in Chalkis (or indeed, anyone, regardless of perma-
nent residence), who found himself required to register as a metic at Athens, 
would lose that status and its consequent tax liabilities upon leaving Athens; 
he needed no decree to ensure that.29 
Ostwald steers a course between Meyer and Whitehead: “The aliens in 
Chalkis who reside there and fulfill no civic obligations to Athens, except for 
anyone who has been granted exemption by the Athenian People, must all 
fulfill their civic obligations to Chalkis, as do all other Chalkidians” (2002: 
140). But he understands the decree to say (a) that if one does not pay Athens 
one shall pay Chalkis, in order to convey (b) that if one does pay Athens one 
shall not pay Chalkis. On this construction, the relative clause does not state 
an exception but the subsequent protasis, καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται h|υπὸ τõ δέμο τõ 
Ἀθεναίον ἀτέλεια, does, in spite of the absence of any indication of such in the 
Greek. This does not close the gap between plain reading and interpretation.
Pébarthe has advanced a different understanding of the legal and economic 
facts, which nevertheless assumes grammar that is quite similar to Whitehead’s: 
“Concernant les étrangers à Chalcis, tous les résidents qui ne paient pas en 
direction d’Athènes, si une atélie leur a été donnée par le peuple athénien, 
ceux-là paient alors en direction de Chalcis comme les Chalcidiens.”30 But the 
suggestion posits an unparalleled ellipsis, under which τελεῖν Ἀθήναζε means 
“to pay transit taxes (when/for shipping goods) to Athens.”31 A solution lying 
closer to the Greek would be welcome.
One exists, I suggest, in a pair of close grammatical parallels that Wilhelm 
identified long ago, but did not explain.32 Though cited often enough, these 
have not enjoyed scrutiny by others either. At I.Ilion 1.37–46 (Syll.3 330), from 
the late fourth century b.c.e, we read:
28 Gauthier, Bull. épigr. 2001: 151.
29 Whitehead 1977: 9: a metic “can stop being one at any time simply by leaving.”
30 See Pébarthe 2005: 90, an interpretation first offered at 1999: 144; same at 2000: 61. 
Followed by Brun 2005: 41 no.12. Again at Pébarthe 2006: 306. 
31 The clearest parallel for the interpretation is Dem. 32.1, which refers to “contracts to 
and from Athens” (τῶν Ἀθήναζε καὶ τῶν Ἀθήνηθεν συμβολαίων), but this is a different 
and much less demanding ellipsis.
32 Wilhelm 1898: 220, and 1942: 126.
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ἐπειδὴ Μαλούσιος κε|λεύει ἐπαγγεῖλαι αὐτῶι ἤδη τὸ συνέδριον, πόσων δεῖται 
παρ’ αὐτοῦ χρημά|των εἴς τε τὸ θέατρον καὶ εἰς τἆλλα κατασσκευάσματα καὶ 
εἰς τ[ὰ] | ἱερὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πρεσβείαν, καί φησι θέλειν παρόντων τῶν συ[ν]|έδρων 
ἤδη δοῦναι πάντα, ἀγαθῆι τύχηι, δεδό[χθαι] τοῖς συ[ν]|έδροις ἐπαγγεῖλαι 
Μαλουσίωι δοῦναι τοῖς ἀγωνοθέταις χρ[υσοῦς] | τρισχιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους 
σὺν τοῖς πέρυσι ὀφειλο[μέ]νοις ἀ[τόκοις], | τοὺς δὲ ἀγωνοθέτας, οἷς μὲν ἂν 
αὐτοὶ χρήσων[ται, τ]ὰ δὲ ἄ[λλα χρή]|ματα θεῖναι [εἰ]ς τὸ ἱερ[ό]ν· ἂν δέ τι 
περιγένηται ἐ[κ]δοθέντ[ων τῶν] | ἔργων, ἀποδοῦναι Μ[αλο]υσίωι·
Since Malousios bids the synedrion announce to him forthwith how much 
money it needs from him, for the theater and for the other constructions and 
for the sacred things and for the embassy, and (since) he says in the presence 
of the synedroi that he is willing forthwith to give everything; for good fortune; 
it has been resolved by the synedroi to ask Malousios to give the agonothetes 
3500 gold staters plus the surplus money owed, without interest. That the 
agonothetes, whatever they need (sc. so much for that), but the remaining 
money they shall deposit in the sanctuary. If a balance remains, once the 
works-contracts have been let, (resolved) to return it to Malousios.
Another example appears at P.Cair.Zen. I 59105.1–3 (257 b.c.e):
[Ἀ]π̣ολλώνιος Πανακέστορι χαίρειν. τοῦ ἐρεβίνθου | [κα]ὶ τῆς μήκωνος ὅσομ 
μὲν ἂν πλῆθος εἰς σπέρμα κ̣α̣τ̣α̣|[χρ]ή̣σησθε, [τ]ὸ δὲ λοιπὸν διατηρεῖτε.
Apollonios to Panakestor, greeting. However much of the chickpea and poppy 
you have used up already (sc. so much for that), but hold on to the rest.
The editors of the papyrus deemed the Greek ungrammatical. But one could 
instead see in both a similar ellipsis,33 the verbal equivalent of a shrug, more 
colloquial than formal: “so much for that,” or “never mind,” or “forget about it.”
It appears not to have been noticed that a passage from Antiphon uses the 
same construction. The speaker is on trial for homicide. His opponents had 
brought suit against him before, but the Archon Basileus had turned the case 
away, apparently on grounds that only two months remained to his term, so 
that the process could not be completed within his magistracy (Antiph. 6.38, 
41–42). Then, after the next Basileus took office the speaker’s opponents 
waited more than two months, even while the speaker was engaging in activi-
ties from which formal accusation would have barred him (44–45). Anyone 
else, the speaker argues, would have brought suit as soon as the new Basileus 
assumed office (45–46):
33 With the Ilian text Dittenberger, Syll.2 169 p.273n7 (retained by Hiller von Gaertringen 
at Syll.3 330 p.550n7) was well at ease: “Apodosis desideratur ex usu notissimo graecorum.”
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Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἅπαντες ὅσοις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ βασιλέως ὁ χρόνος μὴ 
ἐγχωρεῖ ..., οὗτοι δ’ ἐπιστάμενοι μὲν τοὺς νόμους ἅπαντας, ὁρῶντες δ’ ἐμὲ 
βουλεύοντα καὶ εἰσιόντ’ εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον—καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ 
Διὸς Βουλαίου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς Βουλαίας ἱερόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰσιόντες οἱ βουλευταὶ 
προσεύχονται, ὧν κἀγὼ εἷς ἦ, ὁ ταὐτὰ πράττων, καὶ εἰς τἆλλα ἱερὰ πάντα εἰσιὼν 
μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς, καὶ θύων καὶ εὐχόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ταύτης, καὶ πρὸς 
τούτοις πρυτανεύσας τὴν πρώτην πρυτανείαν ἅπασαν πλὴν δυοῖν ἡμέραιν, καὶ 
ἱεροποιῶν καὶ θύων ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας, καὶ ἐπιψηφίζων καὶ λέγων γνώμας 
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ πλείστου ἀξίων τῇ πόλει φανερὸς ἦ· καὶ οὗτοι παρόντες 
καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντες, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς ἀπογράφεσθαι καὶ εἴργειν ἐμὲ τούτων ἁπάντων, 
οὐκ ἠξίουν ἀπογράφεσθαι·
And all other people for whom there is not time (to file suit) during the same 
Basileus’s term (sc. so much for them)—but these men, though they know all 
of the laws and though they see me serving as a member of the Council and 
entering the Council house (and in the Council house there is a shrine of Zeus 
Boulaios and Athena Boulaia, and on entering the councillors pray [there], of 
whom I too was one, who did the same things, and in entering all the other 
shrines with the Council, and in sacrificing and praying on behalf of this city, 
and in addition to these things in having served as prytany the entire first pry-
tany, except for two days, and in serving as hieropoios and sacrificing on behalf 
of the democracy, and in initiating votes and offering motions concerning the 
greatest and most valuable matters for the city I was in full public view), yes, 
these men, though present and in town, though it was possible for them to 
register and bar me from all of these (activities), never saw fit to register me.
Editors and commentators rightly see an ellipsis at the start of the lengthy 
sentiment (“All others for whom there is not time—but these ....”). Editors 
would emend.34 I urge instead that Antiphon deployed the same elliptical 
convention that Wilhelm found in the inscription from Ilion and the Zenon 
papyrus, and that the Athenian decree on Chalkis did as well:
τὸς δ|ὲ χσένος τὸς ἐν Χαλκίδι, hόσοι οἰκõντες | μὲ τελõσιν Ἀθέναζε, καὶ εἴ τοι 
δέδοται h|υπὸ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεναίον ἀτέλεια, τὸς δὲ ἄ|λλος τελε˜ν ἐς Χαλκίδα, 
καθάπερ hοι ἄλλο|ι Χαλκιδέες.
that the xenoi in Chalkis, who, residing (there), do not pay tax to Athens, and 
if ateleia has been granted to anyone by the Athenian people, (sc. so much for 
these two groups), but that the others shall pay to Chalkis, just as the other 
Chalkidians (pay).
34 Gernet prints “ἐγχωρεῖ ..., οὗτοι” and notes, “Inter ἐγχωρεῖ et οὗτοι verba excidisse pa-
tet,” a notional translation of which he supplies: “se hâte de se faire inscrire sous le suivant.”
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The Greek does not contain a word or phrase denoting exception, although 
the particular grammatical construction implies it: “The xenoi of two sorts (sc. 
so much for them), but the rest shall pay.” The δὲ is not apodotic.35 The rela-
tive clause hόσοι ... | μὲ τελõσιν means “those who do not pay,” as Whitehead 
and others thought. The “others” (τὸς δὲ ἄ|λλος) do not recapitulate τὸς δ|ὲ 
χσένος τὸς ἐν Χαλκίδι, but are distinguished from them, as Meyer and others 
thought. The latter are the subjects of an elliptical verb (μὲ τελε˜ν vel sim.) and 
the former alone the subject of τελε˜ν. Together, these clauses are meant to 
confer immunity on two constituent elements of a larger group and liability 
on the rest. All of this is made explicit in the Greek by an elliptical expression 
attested in at least two later documents and at least one fifth-century speech.
35 Nor δὲ “after πλὴν,” as adduced by Dover 1978 and supported by Henry 1979, al-
though their instincts were right. No word or phrase for “except” appears, but a logic of 
exception, under the different construction, which Wilhelm appears to have identified, 
is present. The precise function envisaged by Denniston is unclear. Most of his examples 
seem elliptical in a manner similar to what we see in IG I3 40 but are also agreeable to a 
parenthetical construction. For example, Hdt 4.189.1: τὴν δὲ ἄρα ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὰς αἰγίδας 
τῶν ἀγαλμάτων τῆς Ἀθηναίης ἐκ τῶν Λιβυσσέων ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Ἕλληνες· πλὴν γὰρ ἢ ὅτι 
σκυτίνη ἡ ἐσθὴς τῶν Λιβυσσέων ἐστὶ καὶ οἱ θύσανοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αἰγίδων αὐτῇσι οὐκ ὄφιές 
εἰσι ἀλλὰ ἱμάντινοι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τὠυτὸ ἔσταλται. (“The Greeks fashioned the 
clothing and aegises of Athena’s cult statues after the Libyan women’s; for except that the 
clothing of the Libyan women is leather and the tassels [that hang] from their aegises are 
not snakes but thongs, [so much for these features] but in all other respects she is outfitted 
in the same way.” Or, parenthetically: “The Greeks fashioned the clothing and aegises of 
Athena’s cult statues after the Libyan women’s; for—except that the clothing of the Libyan 
women is leather and the tassels [that hang] from their aegises are not snakes but thongs, 
but in all other respects [yes]—she is outfitted in the same way.”) At least one of his ex-
amples must be parenthetical (Pl. Leg. 873e–874a): ἐὰν δ’ ἄρα ὑποζύγιον ἢ ζῷον ἄλλο τι 
φονεύσῃ τινά, πλὴν τῶν ὅσα ἐν ἀγῶνι τῶν δημοσίᾳ τιθεμένων ἀθλεύοντά τι τοιοῦτον 
δράσῃ, ἐπεξίτωσαν μὲν οἱ προσήκοντες τοῦ φόνου τῷ κτείναντι, διαδικαζόντων δὲ τῶν 
ἀγρονόμων οἷσιν ἂν καὶ ὁπόσοις προστάξῃ ὁ προσήκων, τὸ δὲ ὀφλὸν ἔξω τῶν ὅρων τῆς 
χώρας ἀποκτείναντας διορίσαι. ἐὰν δὲ ἄψυχόν τι ψυχῆς ἄνθρωπον στερήσῃ, πλὴν ὅσα 
κεραυνὸς ἤ τι παρὰ θεοῦ τοιοῦτον βέλος ἰόν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσα τινὸς προσπεσόντος ἢ 
αὐτὸ ἐμπεσὸν κτείνῃ τινά, δικαστὴν μὲν αὐτῷ καθιζέτω τῶν γειτόνων τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὁ 
προσήκων γένει, ἀφοσιούμενος ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς συγγενείας ὅλης, τὸ δὲ ὀφλὸν 
ἐξορίζειν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη τὸ τῶν ζῴων γένος. The passage envisages two legal scenarios: 
homicide by non-human animal and homicide by inanimate object. In the first case, the 
structure is: But (δὲ) if A (except [πλὴν] for certain conditions), then (μὲν) X, and (δὲ) Y, 
and (δὲ) Z. The second adds a complement to the exception: But (δὲ) if A (except [πλὴν] 
for certain conditions, but [δὲ] [including] the rest), then (μὲν) X, and (δὲ) Y.
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***
Some ambiguity remains. First, Greek does not demand that οἰκõντες de-
note residence “(in Chalkis)”; it also permits residence in Athens, which no 
commentator seems to have considered. Next, wherever the aliens lived, the 
modality of the circumstantial participle οἰκõντες must be inferred from 
context.36 Finally, τελõσιν could be either indicative (τελοῦσιν) or subjunc-
tive (τελῶσιν). Thus, on the interpretation suggested above and in the light of 
these further grammatical ambiguities, Antikles proposed “that the xenoi in 
Chalkis, who, because (/ although / when / if / on condition that) they reside 
(in Chalkis / in Athens), do not (/ are not to) pay tax to Athens and if ateleia 
has been granted to anyone by the Athenian people (he too) (so much for these), 
but that the others shall pay to Chalkis, just as the other Chalkidians (pay).” 
It appears that no one—at least not in print—has analyzed systematically 
the possible combinations of modality and place of residence with a view to 
finding a plausible construction of the rule. Let us do that here.37 
1.a.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who although they live in Chalkis do/
shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. On this interpretation, a group 
of Athenian citizens who resided at Chalkis had previously received immunity 
from Athenian taxation, and this decree now extended that immunity to apply 
to Chalkidian taxes as well. This assumes the existence of an otherwise unat-
tested practice under which Athenians residing abroad, or at least at Chalkis, 
were required to pay taxes to Athens, from afar. Such cannot have applied, 
say, to sales tax, where the challenge of compliance and enforcement would 
have been extreme. But if liturgies are meant, as Giovannini argued (2000: 
71–74), then the clause enjoined Chalkis from requiring resident Athenians 
to serve, if those Athenians had already received immunity from the putative 
requirement to perform liturgies at Athens while residing abroad.
The liability of Athenians resident abroad to Athenian liturgies is not 
demonstrated. In the better documented period of the 350s b.c.e, we are not 
certain of the liability even of cleruchs.38 And they formed a special class of 
36 Whitehead 1976: 258, urged that it must be “neutral, unemphatic” rather than causal 
or concessive.
37 I omit means and manner, which do not give sense. We may exclude the possibil-
ity that the taxes at issue were a putative Chalkidian metoikion, for the text cannot have 
stipulated payment of such to Chalkis “as the other Chalkidians (pay).”
38 Christ 2006: 151–52 suggests that the difficulty of nominating someone who lived 
abroad probably meant immunity for cleruchs, in fact if not in law, regardless of the 
scope of their property at home. See also MacDowell 2004: 127n4. Gabrielsen 1994: 
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citizen of whom the state was formally cognizant—and perhaps even of their 
foreign holdings.39 Other Athenians abroad were a different matter.
Against Leptines’ law, which barred all but the descendants of Harmodios 
and Aristogeiton from receiving immunities from liturgical service, 
Demosthenes argued that to void the ateleia enjoyed by the Bosporan king 
and honorary Athenian citizen Leukon would be to declare open season on his 
financial assets. Demosthenes could hardly imagine that anyone nominated 
to a liturgy would not initiate antidosis against the king!40 Leukon would 
be an easy target, at once rich and unavailable to defend himself in court.41 
87–90, holds that cleruchs’ properties abroad were to be immune from consideration 
and assessment toward duty, but that “if in possession of sufficient property at Athens” 
(88), the cleruchs themselves were still liable. The key source is Dem. 14.16: ἐὰν γὰρ τοῦτ’ 
ἀποδείξητε τὸ πλῆθος, ἡγοῦμαι, τῶν ἐπικλήρων καὶ τῶν ὀρφανῶν καὶ τῶν κληρουχικῶν 
καὶ τῶν κοινωνικῶν καὶ εἴ τις ἀδύνατος ἀφαιρεθέντων, ἔσεσθαι χίλια καὶ διακόσια ταῦθ’ 
ὑμῖν σώματα (“For if you set this as the number, I reckon—once the epikleroi, orphans, 
klerouchika, koinonika, and anyone who is incapable are subtracted—you will have 
twelve hundred individuals”). Orphanoi is a category of persons, whereas klerouchika and 
koinonika are not; if Demosthenes had meant to indicate that cleruchs were personally 
immune he would have specified κληρούχων rather than κληρουχικῶν. The two positions 
need not be mutually exclusive: perhaps the exception of klerouchika referred to cleruchs’ 
holdings abroad, but that foreign residence would have made successful nomination of 
cleruchs, in most cases, too difficult to be worth the fuss, even if their domestic holdings 
were sufficient to warrant nomination and they themselves were de iure liable. 
39 For possible records of cleruchic holdings abroad see Morrison 2003: 109–13: IG 
I3 44 [=Agora XIX L1]; 418 [=Agora XIX L2], the famous list of Euboian temene long 
thought to have been recorded after the Athenian conquest of 446/5; 420. A passage in 
the Aristotelian Oikonomika mentions eisphora imposed by Athenian cleruchs on the 
Potidaians, a local initiative: Arist. [Oec.] II 1347a18–24. See van Groningen 1933: 76; 
Zoeppfel 2006: 20; Thomsen 1964: 41–42. Moggi 1979: 137–42, prefers the fourth century 
to the fifth. Cargill 1995: 194 suggests that the assessed property here may have included 
only what cleruchs possessed over and above their kleroi. Christ 2007: 55n8 notes on 
the basis of this episode “that the eisphora could be levied more broadly within a state”; 
presumably, this is not meant to suggest imposition by Athens.
40 Dem. 20.40: καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ὅπως οὐκ ἀντιδώσει τῷ Λεύκωνί τις, ἂν βούληται, δύναμαι 
σκοπούμενος εὑρεῖν. χρήματα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀεὶ παρ’ ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ, κατὰ δὲ τὸν νόμον 
τοῦτον, ἐάν τις ἐπ’ αὔτ’ ἔλθῃ, ἢ στερήσεται τούτων ἢ λῃτουργεῖν ἀναγκασθήσεται (“And 
in fact, upon consideration, I cannot see how one would not bring an antidosis challenge 
against Leukon, if he wishes.”). A citizen (Dem. 20.30): ἔστι γὰρ γένει μὲν δήπου ὁ Λεύκων 
ξένος, τῇ δὲ παρ’ ὑμῶν ποιήσει πολίτης (“For while Leukon may be a foreigner by birth, 
he is a citizen by adoption by you”).
41 Of course, antidosis claims were made largely against visible assets, of which Leukon 
will not have had many at Athens; Demosthenes speaks of χρήματα—here, most likely 
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But Leukon was a special case and Demosthenes’ hypothetical does not 
demonstrate anything about normal liability.42 The difficulty in compelling 
Athenian citizens resident abroad to serve as, say, choregos probably meant 
that in practice liability stopped at the border. The logistics of bringing or 
responding to antidosis claims would have made engagement by Athenians 
resident abroad a great challenge; they would have had to be present to object 
to their nomination or else respond to antidosis claims brought against them; 
they might have had to stay in town for weeks or months during the process 
of inspection and possible adjudication through diadikasia.43 Target selection 
for proposed antidosis could apparently be strategic,44 but we do not read 
of opportunistic claims brought against Athenians resident abroad, which 
would have become common if such individuals had been liable. Long-term 
absentees do not appear to have been called to liturgies.
The fourth century was not the fifth, but, even so, it seems scarcely pos-
sible that at the time of IG I3 40’s passage Athens asserted a right to demand 
liturgical service from its citizens living abroad.
1.a.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who although they live in Chalkis 
do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. Under this interpretation, 
the clause confers on a group of non-Athenians that has already received im-
munity from Athenian taxation further immunity from Chalkidian taxation. 
This assumes law under which Athens required non-Athenians resident else-
where than Athens to pay taxes to Athens. Here again, liturgical service should 
be the issue. On the face of it, the plausibility of compelling non-Athenians 
living abroad to perform liturgies for Athens seems quite remote. And yet 
one litigant appears to claim that his father, a citizen of Mytilene, has served 
Athens just so (Antiph. 5.77):
money—which will have been invested and invisible. On concealment of assets see Christ 
2006: 191–94; Cohen 1992: 191–201; Gabrielsen 1987: 99–114.
42 Cf. Giovannini 2000: 68: “Comme Leucon ne résidait évidemment pas à Athènes 
de manière durable, ce texte prouve qu’il n’était même pas nécessaire de résider dans une 
cité, que ce soit comme citoyen ou comme étranger, pour y être astreint à une liturgie: ce qui 
était déterminant, c’était d’y avoir des biens, mobiliers ou immobiliers, et c’était sur ces 
biens, indépendamment de la présence physique de leur propriétaire, que celui-ci pouvait 
être astreint à une liturgie” [his emphasis]. Kremmydas 2012: 264 notes that “the ateleia 
conferred on Leukon did not carry any practical benefits for him. Although he was made 
an Athenian citizen, he was not resident at Athens, [and] therefore he did not have the 
same responsibilities as ‘normal’ citizens, i.a. the performance of liturgies, or army service, 
which were conditioned on residence in Athens.”
43 See Dem. 42 passim on procedure.
44 See, e.g., Lys. 3.20, 4.1–2; Dem. 28.17; Christ 1990: 147–69.
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ἐπεὶ δ’ ὑμεῖς τοὺς αἰτίους τούτων ἐκολάσατε, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐφαίνετο ὢν ὁ ἐμὸς 
πατήρ, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις Μυτιληναίοις ἄδειαν ἐδώκατε οἰκεῖν τὴν σφετέραν 
αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ὕστερον αὐτῷ ἡμάρτηται[, τῷ ἐμῷ πατρί], οὐδ’ ὅ τι οὐ 
πεποίηται τῶν δεόντων, οὐδ’ ἧς τινος λῃτουργίας ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γεγένηται, 
οὔτε ἡ ὑμετέρα οὔτε ἡ Μυτιληναίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χορηγίας ἐχορήγει καὶ τέλη 
κατατίθησιν. 
But once you punished those who were guilty of these things [i.e., revolt against 
Athens], among whom my father was not found to be, and granted to the other 
Mytilenians the concession to inhabit their own property, there has been no 
wrong committed by him subsequently, nor anything needed that he has not 
done, not even any liturgy that the city has needed, neither yours nor the Myt-
ilenians’, but he is even in the habit of performing choregiai and he pays tele.
Now, this case is not precisely parallel, since it speaks to the obligations of 
a subject-city’s citizenry, rather than its aliens. But it bears on the liability 
of non-Athenians living outside Athens. The Greek, though, is opaque. We 
do not know what the tele were. The choregiai may have been performed at 
and for Mytilene.45 But the speaker seems to assert that his father performed 
whatever services Athens and Mytilene needed. Perhaps he is dissembling, or 
implying that to serve Athens’s subject is to serve Athens, or that his father 
had volunteered for some service whose performance law did not compel. 
Perhaps he speaks of general service and not the narrower set of obligations 
associated with the word ‘liturgy.’46 Perhaps “these services are to be distrib-
uted chiastically—khoregiai for Mytilene, taxes for Athens,” and perhaps the 
Athenian convention of proving one’s virtue by referring to liturgical service 
was so powerful that “citizens of subject-states on trial in Athenian courts 
did their best to conform to it, even if, as is likely in this case, the khoregiai 
had nothing to do with Athens and τέλη was a somewhat flattering term for 
the 5 per cent flat-rate of imperial tribute or the rents due to the Athenian 
kleroukhs”; but even so, “[i]t would however be interesting to learn that very 
rich citizens of subject cities were called on to perform certain khoregiai in 
Athens.”47 But if Athens reserved the right to compel foreign subjects to per-
45 Gagarin 1997: 213.
46 This does appear to be the earliest use of the term in Attic prose; Lewis 1960: 181, 
182, however, suggests that the word’s use in this passage is consistent with classical, 
fifth-century practice, meaning trierarchy, choregia, gymnasiarchy, etc., and with later, 
late fifth-/early fourth-century, use, meaning “any service to the community.”
47 Wilson 2000: 182, 361n97. The chiasmus seems a weak explanation, since οὔτε ἡ 
ὑμετέρα οὔτε ἡ Μυτιληναίων clearly qualifies the preceding ἡ πόλις and is separated from 
the following καὶ χορηγίας ἐχορήγει καὶ τέλη κατατίθησιν with ἀλλὰ.
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form liturgies at Athens, philotimia alone could not have kept Athenians from 
routinely bringing antidosis challenges against such vulnerable foreigners. If 
such a gaping loophole had been available, how many Athenians would have 
served? This scenario is improbable.
1.b.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who although they live in Athens do/
shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This interpretation presupposes 
an enactment under which certain Athenians who had been granted immunity 
from taxation at Athens were to enjoy the same protection from Chalkidian 
taxes. Athenians were on occasion granted immunity from liturgical service.48 
This construction of the clause is, therefore, possible.
1.b.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who although they live in Athens 
do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. On this interpretation, 
the clause excepted from Chalkidian taxation any alien in Chalkis who had 
been granted immunity from Athenian taxation even if he should reside in 
Athens. Athenian grants of ἀτέλεια τοῦ μετοικίου, for example, were just such 
an exception. This interpretation, then, is possible, and also analogous to the 
exemption that immediately follows (54–55). In both cases, those who by 
special grant did not pay Athens now could not be made to not pay Chalkis.
2.a.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who because they live in Chalkis do/shall 
not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. On this construction, Athenians who 
had or would shed liability to Athenian taxation by moving to Chalkis were 
to be immune to taxation by Chalkis; this would have made Chalkis a tax-
free zone for any Athenian who wished to relocate there. This is conceivable.
2.a.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who because they live in Chalkis 
do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This would have exempted 
all non-Athenian non-Chalkidians resident at Chalkis from taxation by 
Chalkis. There is no reason to think Athens would have cared about privi-
leges belonging to those who enjoyed none at Athens. But this is perhaps not 
inconceivable, as a brutal punishment: it would have barred Chalkis from 
taxing virtually all metics. 
2.b.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who because they live in Athens do/
shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This scarcely makes sense. 
No Athenian was exempt from Athenian taxation because he lived in Athens 
(unless this is a clumsy way of expressing 1.b.i). This is unlikely.
48 E.g., Dem. 20.29, 67–87.
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2.b.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who because they live in Athens do/
shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. As an expression of normative 
procedure this is nonsense (unless it be a clumsy way of expressing 1.b.ii; as 
with 2.b.i). This is unlikely.
3.a.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who when they live in Chalkis do/shall 
not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This is effectively equivalent to 2.a.i 
above, tax immunity for any Athenian wishing to reside in Chalkis, or else, 
as 1.a.i above, expresses an exception to an otherwise unattested regulation 
under which Athenians residing at Chalkis were required to pay taxes to Athens.
3.a.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who when they live in Chalkis do/
shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This is effectively equivalent 
to 2.a.ii above, tax immunity for any non-Athenian, non-Chalkidian wishing 
to take up residence in Chalkis.
3.b.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who when they live in Athens do/shall 
not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This means that any Athenian who 
does not pay taxes to Athens when he lives in Athens shall not pay taxes to 
Chalkis when he is present in Chalkis. As with 1.b.i above this is a possible 
interpretation.
3.b.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who when they live in Athens do/
shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This scenario is not unlike 
that of 1.b.ii above, an extension of ateleia in Athens and granted by Athens, 
so that recipients of this award were able to claim the same exemption in 
Chalkis. This too is possible.
 4.a.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who if / provided that they live in Chalkis 
do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This interpretation is 
plausible only if we assume the existence of an otherwise unattested policy 
at Athens under which Athenians resident in foreign cities were nevertheless 
eligible for liturgical service at Athens (see 1.a.i above).
4.a.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who if / provided that they live 
in Chalkis do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This is even 
less likely than the preceding inasmuch as it posits (unattested) policy under 
which non-Athenians resident outside Athens were liable to Athenian taxation.
4.b.i: That Athenians in Chalkis, who, if / provided that they live in Athens 
do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This interpretation is not 
impossible, as with 1.b.i and 3.b.i above.
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4.b.ii: That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who, if / provided that they live in 
Athens do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This is essentially 
the same plausible scenario suggested by interpretations 1.b.ii and 3.b.ii above.
This is a lot to digest. But a couple of facts emerge. First, a great deal 
rides on the plausibility of 1.a.i, namely the existence of law or convention 
in accordance with which Athenian citizens resident abroad—or at least in 
Chalkis—were liable to Athenian liturgical service. There is, so far as I know, 
no compelling evidence for such law, but if it did exist then IG I3 40 may 
have extended this immunity to cover Chalkidian taxation as well. If so, then 
1.a.i, 3.a.i, and 4.a.i above may be possible interpretations. In the absence of 
positive evidence, however, it is hard to accept these as probable. If we strike 
them and the other unlikely candidates, we are left with two basic possibilities.
First, 2.a.i + 2.a.ii, 3.a.ii: That Athenians and non-Athenians in Chalkis, 
who because they live in Chalkis do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay 
Chalkis; and That non-Athenians in Chalkis, who when they live in Chalkis 
do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay Chalkis. This will have amounted to a 
brutal curtailment of Chalkis’s right to tax aliens within its borders, stipulating 
that all non-Chalkidians who do not pay taxes to Athens as a result of their 
residence in Chalkis—in effect, all non-Chalkidians—are to be immune from 
taxation by Chalkis. Empires do harsh things. But under this interpretation 
Chalkis could not tax any aliens, so that “the others” (τὸς δὲ ἄ|λλος) cannot 
have existed. Thus, the clauses were not simply meant to confer immunity 
on any non-Chalkidian who took up residence in Chalkis and therefore was 
not (or, in case of an Athenian, no longer was) liable to Athenian taxation.
The remaining and, I suggest, correct scenario is 1.b.i&ii, 3.b.i&ii, 4.b.i&ii: 
That Athenians and non-Athenians in Chalkis, who although / when / if / 
provided that they live in Athens do/shall not pay to Athens, shall not pay 
Chalkis. In an argument meant to minimize the ranks of the immune at the 
time (355 b.c.e), Demosthenes put the number of citizens with ateleia at 
around five or six, and metics at ten, which must have been low estimates.49 In 
the fourth century, some metics were honored with immunity from Athenian 
taxation, on condition of residence in Athens. Immunity from the metic tax 
was inherently conditional50 and as a legal fact this might be left unsaid,51 for 
49 Dem. 20.21; low estimate: Hagemajer Allen 2003: 204–5. Demosthenes’ estimate of 
the total number of liturgies per year is dramatically low.
50 Restored but likely: IG II2 61.8–11: ε῏ναι Ἀ|[...... τῶι Σ]ικελιώτη|[ι ἀτέλειαν τõ] 
μετοικί|[ο οἰκõντι Ἀθήν]ησι. 
51 IG II2 245.9–11: εἶναι [δὲ πᾶσι | τοῖς φεύγοσι τῶν] Βοιωτῶν τὴν [ἀ]τέλ[ει]α[ν τõ 
μ|ετοικίου· καλέ]σαι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ξένια.
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metic status entailed legal residence. Concurrent grants of egktesis and atel-
eia necessarily recognized a connection between residence and immunity.52 
A number of special grants from the fourth century did as well. In 363/2 
Athens decreed citizenship to Astykrates, who along with several others had 
been exiled from Delphi, their property there having been confiscated (CID 
II 67–72); to him went ateleia “while” (or “provided that” or “so long as”) he 
resided at Athens.53 A return to Delphi would end his status, and the immu-
nity. The Akarnanians whom Athens honored in 338/7 were to enjoy egktesis 
and immunity from the metic tax only until they returned home.54 Grants 
of isoteleia were similarly conditional.55 Thus, in fourth-century Athens tax-
immunity/-equality and residence were tightly related. Conferral of these 
privileges is less well attested in the fifth century, but it must be stressed that 
the metoikia itself was both a privilege and an automatic consequence of 
prolonged presence.56 Beyond a month or so,57 in the eyes of Athenian law, 
presence and residence were the same fact. And while the privilege included 
access to the judicial system, to ritual, and to military service (in all three cases, 
less than a citizen’s but more than a non-metic alien’s), what looms largest in 
the evidence is the “privilege” of contributing the metoikion and, depending 
on wealth, eisphora and liturgies. A metic was, by definition, an alien who 
was present long enough to be required to pay his or her fair share of tele.58 
52 E.g., IG II2 8.17–19: ε῏ναι Ἡρακλε|ίδηι] γῆς ἔγκτησιν κα[ὶ οἰκίας Ἀθήνησι|ν καὶ 
ἀ]τέλειαν; 53.1–3: ε῏|να]ι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησιγ καὶ ἀτέλ|[ειαν αὐτῶι] καὶ τοῖς 
ἐκγόνοις Ἀθήνησι.
53 IG II2 109.b.15–16: εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶι κα[ὶ ἀτ]έλειαν οἰ|κõντι Ἀθήνησι.
54 IG II2 237.22–26: ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς | [ἄλλ]ο[υς Ἀ]κ[α]ρ[νᾶνας τ]οὺς 
βο[ι]ηθήσαντας μετὰ Φορμίω|[νος κ]α[ὶ Κα]ρφ[ίνα καὶ] εἶναι αὐ[τ]οῖς, ἕως ἂν 
κατέλθωσι|[ν ἔγκτησιν ὧν ἂν] ο[ἰκι]ῶν βούλωνται οἰκοῦσιν Ἀθήνη|[σι ἀτελέσι τõ 
μετοι]κ[ί]ου. Similarly, though heavily restored, IG II2 545.8–15 (after 318/17); for other 
grants to exiles and fugitives see IG II2 33.5–8 (ca. 385); IG II2 211.1–15 (348/7).
55 IG  II2 276.12–15 (before 336/5): [ε|ἶν]αι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ ἰσοτέλειαν καὶ 
ἐκγ[ό]|νοις οἰκοῦντι Ἀθήνησιν καθάπερ τοῖ[ς] | ἄλλοις ἰσοτελέσιν; 287.2–7 (before 336/5): 
δ[εδόσθαι] | αὐτοῖς ἰσοτέ[λε]ιαν οἰκο[ῦσιν Ἀ]|θήνησιν [κ]αὶ τ[ὰς] εἰσφορὰς εἰσφ|έρειν καὶ 
τὰ τέλη τελεῖν καθάπ|ερ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὰς στρατείας | στρατ[εύ]εσθαι μετὰ Ἀθηναίων.
56 For recent discussion of ordinary and “privileged” metics see Kamen 2013: 43–61.
57 On duration see Whitehead 1977: 7–10; on terms and definitions 6–20 is funda-
mental.
58 Ar. Byz. (Nauck) 38: μέτοικος δέ ἐστιν ὁπόταν τις ἀπὸ ξένης ἐλθὼν ἐνοικῇ τῇ πόλει, 
τέλος τελῶν εἰς ἀποτεταγμένας τινὰς χρείας τῆς πόλεως· ἕως μὲν οὖν ποσῶν ἡμερῶν 
παρεπίδημος καλεῖται καὶ ἀτελής ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβῇ τὸν ὡρισμένον χρόνον, μέτοικος 
ἤδη γίνεται καὶ ὑποτελής (“One is a metic whenever, having come from a foreign place, 
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Tax-liability and residence were two sides of a coin. No award of immunity 
can have been granted, and especially not to a metic, without consideration 
of its being conditional on residence.
The particular phrasing, which has troubled moderns, arose out of a com-
mon ancient formula. “To have ateleia” (εἶναι τινι ἀτέλειαν) was “not to pay 
tele” (μὴ τελεῖν); “to have ateleia on condition of residence at Athens” (εἶναι 
τινι ἀτέλειαν οἰκοῦντι Ἀθήνησι)59 would have been “not to pay tele on condi-
tion of residence at Athens” (μὴ τελεῖν οἰκοῦντα Ἀθήνησι vel sim.). Someone 
with ateleia Ἀθήνησι did not enjoy immunity “from taxes (sc. otherwise to 
be paid) to Athens,” but rather “from taxes while at Athens”60; the lone dative 
bespoke a condition of presence or, more likely, residence, and was cognate 
with the common phrase, εἶναι τινι ἀτέλειαν οἰκοῦντι Ἀθήνησι. The award-
ing of privileges “on condition of residence at Athens” was common in the 
fourth century, and was inevitably conveyed with a circumstantial parti-
ciple.61 If the decree on Chalkis were uttered then, the words hόσοι οἰκõντες 
one dwells in the city, paying taxes toward any appointed uses of the city. For up to so 
many days, then, one is called a ‘visitor’ and is not liable to the tax, but if one exceeds the 
designated time, one becomes a metic forthwith and is liable.”).
59 See, e.g., IG II2 109.b.15–16 (363/3): εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶι κα[ὶ ἀτ]έλειαν οἰ|κõντι Ἀθήνησι.
60 See, e.g., IG II3 53.1–3 (before 387/6): ε῏|να]ι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησιγ καὶ 
ἀτέλ|[ειαν αὐτῶι] καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις Ἀθήνησι.
61 Such bore considerable weight. In the decree on Chalkis, the Athenian oath requires 
takers to swear fulfillment “for the Chalkidians, provided that they obey the people of 
Athens” (IG I3 40.14–16): ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπ̣|[ε]δόσο Χαλκιδεῦσιν πειθομένοις τõι δέ|[μ]οι 
τõι Ἀθεναίον). An Athenian decree of 387/6 likewise predicates powers to be enjoyed by 
Klazomenai and actions barred to Athens (I.Erythrai/Klazomenai 502.6–13, with SEG 
LIX 101). An Athenian alliance with Chios promises freedom and autonomy provided 
that the Chians do not transgress the written terms: IG II2 34.15–19 (384/3). Ambiguities 
around such can be problematic. The second amendment to the United States Constitution 
begins with an ambiguous participial phrase: “A well regulated militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be 
infringed.” The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) p.2–4 (also Syll. 1.a p.1), held that the prefatory (participial) 
clause indicated purpose and thus did not limit the operative clause that followed; that 
(p.3) “The Amendment could be rephrased, ‘Because a well regulated Militia is necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 
infringed.’” And (p.26) the “prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right 
was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.” This seems to conflate what antiquity 
regarded as distinct motives: (1) “in order that X may be the case, Y is decreed,” and (2) 
“since X is the case, Y is decreed.” In any case, it is clear that the prefatory clause could 
not be rephrased, “so long as/provided that a well regulated militia is necessary to the 
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μὲ τελõσιν Ἀθέναζε would likely have sounded to the Athenian ear like the 
familiar formula. But the expression μὴ τελεῖν introduced an element that 
was implicit in Athenian grants of ateleia: the entity to whom payment was 
(not) offered, here Ἀθέναζε. For an Athenian legislator, articulating the fact 
of previously awarded immunity, at Athens, as applied to someone who was 
subsequently at Chalkis, was a task that required more than boilerplate alone. 
And so while Antikles did not need to specify Ἀθήνησι, which was obvious in 
context, formulaic, he had to be very clear that the precondition for immunity 
at Chalkis was immunity “back at Athens,” where aliens covered by the clause 
had previously resided. And so, rather than a putative fuller expression, hόσοι 
οἰκõντες Ἀθένεσι μὲ τελõσιν Ἀθέναζε, we find the shorter phrase, hόσοι 
οἰκõντες μὲ τελõσιν Ἀθέναζε.
But if the clauses envisage payment at Athens, rather than payment to 
Athens from a remote location, why stipulate Ἀθέναζε? The suffix –δε does 
overwhelmingly indicate motion hither in the inscriptions. But not always. 
Under a provision of Archestratos’s rider, Chalkidians were to retain the right 
of euthyna except in cases where punishment was exile, death, or disfranchise-
ment; in such cases “there shall be ephesis at Athens (Ἀθέναζε) to the heliaia 
of the Thesmothetai.”62 The nearly contemporary Eleusinian first fruits decree 
stipulates “that the demarchs collect deme by deme and hand (the grain) over 
(παραδιδόναι) to the hieropoioi-from-Eleusis at Eleusis (Ἐλευσῖνάδε).”63 Now, 
in both cases motion was not explicit in the grammar, but inherent in the real-
world process: litigants had to go to Athens in order to bring the case to the 
heliaia64; demarchs had to go to Eleusis in order to deliver the grain. Motion 
security of a free state ....”). This would limit the operative clause. For syllabus, opinion, 
and dissents see: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07–290.ZO.html.
62 IG I3 40.74–76: περὶ δὲ τούτον ἔφεσιν ε῏να|ι Ἀθέναζε ἐς τὲν ἑλιαίαν τὲν τõν 
θεσμοθ|ετõν. See also IG II2 1128.20–21: εἶν]|αι [δὲ] καὶ ἔφεσιν Ἀθήναζε καὶ τῶι φήναντι 
καὶ τῶι ἐνδεί[ξαντι.
63 I.Eleusis 28a.8–10 [=IG I3 78a.8–10]: ἐγλέγεν δὲ [τὸς δ]εμ|άρχος κατὰ τὸς δέμος καὶ 
παραδιδόναι τοῖς hιεροποιοῖς τοῖς | Ἐλευσινόθεν Ἐλευσῖνάδε.
64 In the case of ephesis, a degree of motion was also inherent in the word’s etymology 
(ἐφίημι): one appealed “to” (εἰς) a venue. See e.g., IG II2 1128.20–21 above; also [Ath. 
Pol.] 45.2: οὐ κυρία δ’ ἡ κρίσις, ἀλλ’ ἐφέσιμος εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον … ἔφεσις δὲ καὶ τούτοις 
ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον; Dem. 57.6: εἰ γὰρ πάντ’ ἐνομίζετε τὰ δίκαια δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς 
δημότας διακρῖναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἔφεσιν (“For if you were of the view that 
the demesmen could decide all cases justly, you would not have granted the right of appeal 
to you”). Thus, inasmuch as “εἰς + accusative” could be equivalent to the suffix –δε, one 
could appeal “to Athens to the heliaia.” In English one “brings charges,” “goes to court,” 
or “takes someone to court” without stressing physical motion.
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was implicit and the suffix indicated location rather than movement.65 For the 
Chalkidian readers of IG I3 40, to contemplate the liability of a person who was 
in Chalkis, but who had formerly resided in Athens, was to envisage activity 
in another place and time, “over there,” “back at Athens.” For an Athenian 
legislator trying to capture that nuance, Ἀθέναζε fit the bill.66
Moreover, in an important and apparently unrecognized sense, the clauses 
explain themselves. The text denotes payment “to Chalkis” with εἰς. To pay to 
Chalkis, at Chalkis, was to pay ἐς Χαλκίδα. If “τελεῖν εἰς + accusative place” 
indicates payment to and at, then why write Ἀθέναζε rather than ἐς Ἀθένας? 
The short answer seems to be that in early Attic documents one simply did 
not go or send ἐς (or εἰς) Ἀθένας (or Ἀθήνας).67 The suffix was preferred.68 
If one did not go εἰς Ἀθήνας, neither did one pay εἰς Ἀθήνας. It does not 
matter that the same decree has Chalkidians swear, “I shall pay tribute unto 
the Athenians (τὸν φόρον ὑποτελõ Ἀθεναίοισιν), whatever I persuade the 
65 An undated Rhodian inscription honored Teleutias for a victory at Olympia (IG XII.1 
76): Τελευτίᾳ Ναυσικλείδου | νενικηκότι Ὀλυμπίαζε | ξυνωρίδι | Καμειρῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν. 
Early in Greek literature, ἐνθάδε meant here/there rather than (strictly) hither/thither (LSJ 
s.v.); see the innumerable and often early examples of ἐνθάδε κεῖται on epitaphs. When 
the Bosporan king Satyros came to suspect that the son of his trusted subject Sopaios was 
conspiring with exiles in Athens, he ordered “those visiting here from Pontos” to seize 
the young man’s assets and ship him back home (Isoc. 17.5): ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδ’ 
ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τά τε χρήματα παρ’ ἐμοῦ παραλαβεῖν καὶ αὐτὸν εἰσπλεῖν 
κελεύειν. These men had traveled from Bosporos to this place (i.e., Athens) from Pontos, but 
their location, not their prior journey, mattered here. Still, they had gone from Bosporos 
to Athens as any member of the jury will have understood. See also Men., Georg. 18–19: 
οὐκ οἶδα γὰρ τὸν ἀδελφὸν εἰ νῦν ἐξ ἀγροῦ | ἐνθάδ’ ἐπιδημεῖ (“For I do not know whether 
her brother is now here, back from the country”), where the emphasis is presence “here” 
rather than movement “hither.” 
66 Perhaps especially so, if the language was framed in dialogue, as envisaged by Fornara 
1977: 41. I owe this observation to N. Papazarkadas, who kindly read an early draft of 
this paper.
67 An exception appears to be a funerary poem, where ἐς Ἀθήνας fits the meter; this 
proves nothing, but it stands out as exceptional nonetheless. IG I3 1353.4–6 (ca.445–425 
b.c.e.?): οὗτος ἀνήρ, ὃς ἔ<σ>ωισεν Ἀθηναίων τρ|ε˜ς φυλάς / ἐκ Παγᾶν ἀγαγὼν διὰ Βοιωτῶν 
ἐς Ἀθήνας, / εὔκλ|εισε Ἀνδοκίδαν δισχίλοις ἀνδραπόδοισιν. Examples in literature, on 
the other hand, are not rare.
68 For Chalkis, the opposite rule prevailed: nowhere in attested Greek literature did 
one go or send to Chalkis with –δε, but rather with εἰς. Andocides claims to have served 
as archetheoros εἰς Ἰσθμὸν καὶ Ὀλυμπίαζε (1.132). Ἰσθμόνδε is a late oddity, appearing 
only at Julian, Πρὸς Ἡράκλειον 8.
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Athenians (to assess).”69 The verb ὑπο-τελεῖν with phoros or syntaxis as direct 
object indicates the payee with the dative, conveying submission of payment 
(see also ὑποτελής). A Chalkidian would no more swear, τὸν φόρον ὑποτελõ 
Ἀθέναζε, than a fifth-century Athenian legislator would exempt those who 
τελõσιν ἐς Ἀθένας. In this time and place at least, to pay –δε meant the same 
as to pay εἰς, and neither implied anything about the relative geography of 
payer and payee.
Finally, this particular provision invokes a prior civic enactment, namely 
that certain individuals enjoy immunity from Athenian taxation, on condi-
tion of residence there. This speaks of compulsion and entitlement, so that 
τελõσιν could be subjunctive and not necessarily indicative: those individuals 
who are not to pay Athens are not to pay Chalkis.
***
If these arguments are accepted then the intent of Antikles’ provisions was—in 
sharp contrast to our modern reconstructions—to render both major cat-
egories of tax-immunity portable, so that (1) all individuals to whom Athens 
had granted immunity from Athenian taxation on condition of residence at 
Athens, along with (2) all to whom Athens had granted immunity that was 
not so limited, could carry those immunities with them to Chalkis, which 
would be barred from taxing them. If you were privileged at Athens you were 
privileged at Chalkis. The clause ensured “that the xenoi in Chalkis, (1) who, 
69 IG I3 40.25–27: κ|αὶ τὸν φόρον ὑποτελõ Ἀθεναίοισιν, hὸν | ἂν πείθο Ἀθεναίος. Cf. 
Pébarthe 1999: 144: “En effet, P. Gauthier attire l’attention sur le sens de τελε˜ν ἐς Χαλκίδα. 
Cette dernière signifie ‘payer pour Chalcis’ ou bien ‘être compté comme Chalcidien’ et 
non pas ‘payer à Chalcis.’ Mais l’autre formule appelle un commentaire similaire: τελõσιν 
Ἀθέναζε ne saurait se traduire par ‘à Athènes’ mais par ‘vers Athènes’”; and n131: “Lorsque 
les Chalcidiens prêtent serment (IG I3 40.26), ils s’engagent de la manière suivante à propos 
du tribut: τὸν φόρον hυποτελõ Ἀθεναίοισιν. Ils n’utilisent pas l’expression Ἀθέναζε.” The 
suggestion that τελε˜ν ἐς here indicates “belonging to” goes back, I think, to Dittenberger 
Syll.2 17 p.29n15: “Qui peregrini Chalcide domicilium habent, exceptis Atheniensibus; 
τελεῖν hic usurpatum ut apud Sophoclem Oed. Reg. 222 ὕστερος γὰρ ἀστὸς εἰς ἀστοὺς τελῶ.” 
But such different uses of τελεῖν so close to each other, the first indicating belonging and 
the second taxation, would be worrisome. More important, we expect τελεῖν to indicate 
“belonging to Athenians” or “Chalkidians,” not to “Athens” or “Chalkis.” See examples at 
LSJ s.v. II.3, along with, e.g., Ion of Chios FGrH III 392 F1.24: οὐ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε εἴρηκε, 
καθ’ ἥντινα αἰτίαν Χῖοι τελοῦσιν ἐς Ἴωνας (“He, however, has not said for what reason 
Chians count as Ionians”). Gauthier 1971: 72, suggests that “to pay for Chalkis” and “to 
be counted as a Chalkidian” are the same historical fact; this good point may be true, but 
in Greek this use of τελεῖν prefers a plural group to a singular composite entity.
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on condition that they reside in Athens, are not to pay tax at Athens, and (2) 
if ateleia has been granted to anyone by the Athenian people, (sc. so much for 
these two groups), but that the other aliens shall pay Chalkis, just as the other 
Chalkidians pay.” Why then wasn’t the second exemption sufficient to cover all 
eventualities? Why not stipulate simply that “Those to whom ateleia had been 
given by the people of Athens” were to be immune from Chalkidian taxation, 
hόσοις δέδοται hυπὸ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεναίον ἀτέλεια vel sim.?
The answer, I suggest, is an Athenian one. There were two basic categories 
of metic, those who resided at Athens without apparent intention to leave 
(e.g., Lysias), and transients who resided elsewhere and who were in town on 
temporary, even if sometimes prolonged, business (e.g., the son of Sopaios, 
Isoc. 17). Athenian law acknowledged no formal distinction between them. 
Both were metics and metics had financial obligations. And yet in the world of 
public honor, there were differences. The rider to the decree according honors 
to Straton of Sidon stipulated that Sidonians visiting Athens for the purpose of 
trade could not be saddled with the metoikion, choregia, or eisphora, “provided 
that they reside in Sidon and are active citizens” there.70 Now, they may have 
been engaged in trade that resulted in their presence in Athens long enough 
to trigger conversion to metic status. But by this decreed exception, duration 
of stay ceased to matter, for them; rather, it was their intention to leave—as 
demonstrated by the purpose of their visit71 and their residence and political 
participation at Sidon—that was decisive. These Sidonians were not barred 
from remaining in the city beyond the period after which one was required to 
register as a metic. Rather, Athenians were barred from invoking the duration 
of their stay as grounds for requiring them to register and so assume liability to 
metics’ financial burdens. Presence was the automatic trigger for liability, but in 
the determination of immunity residence and intent—in this case “domicile” 
might be more apt—could be decisive.72 Any non-Sidonian merchant whose 
70 IG II2 141.30–36: ὁπόσοι δ’ ἂν Σιδω|νίων οἰκõντες ἐς Σιδῶνι καὶ πολι|τευόμενοι 
ἐπιδημῶσιν κατ’ ἐμπορ|ίαν Ἀθήνησι, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτὸς μετ|οίκιον πράττεσθαι μηδὲ χορηγὸν 
| μηδένα καταστῆσαι μηδ’ εἰσφορὰν | μηδεμίαν ἐπιγράφεν. For “active political engage-
ment” see IG II2 448.60–62 (323/2): ἀφείλοντο [αὐτὸν] | τὰς δωρεὰς οἱ ἐν τεῖ ὀλιαρχίαι 
πολιτευόμεν[οι καὶ] | τὰς στήλας καθεῖλον.
71 This is itself insufficient proof. The son of Sopaios alleges that he was in Athens “for 
trade and sight-seeing,” and yet he stayed long enough to be made to pay eisphora (Isoc. 
17.4, 41). The danger he found himself in, however, did raise the prospect of his inability 
to return and, therefore, of a long term stay.
72 See Giovannini 2000: 69–70 on Roman jurisprudence on domicilium. For the hon-
ored Sidonians, even if their stay at Athens exceeded the period beyond which an alien 
became a metic, both residence in his home state and political participation are stated as 
requirements for retaining immunity. 
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business kept him in Athens long enough would be required to register as a 
metic, no matter how strong his intention to return to his physical and political 
home. Such individuals were both visitors, by intent, and residents, in law.73 
Moreover, Sidonians who relocated to Athens also fell outside the protected 
class and would have been required to register. Immunities for any of these 
individuals would likely have been conditioned on residence: so long as they 
were in Athens, they would be free from the metoikion, eisphora, or whatever, 
but upon their departure immunity and metic status would die together.
Athenians kept these categories in mind. Against Leptines’ law barring all 
ateleia, except that enjoyed by descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton, 
Demosthenes argued:74
Next, gentlemen, by having it written in his law clearly that “no citizen or pos-
sessor of tax-equality or alien shall be tax-immune,” and by having drawn no 
distinction as to tax-immunity from which telos—i.e., from the choregia or some 
other telos—but (by stating) simply that “no one shall be tax-immune except the 
descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton”; and by including all others with 
the words “no one,” while, not distinguishing in the case of the word “metics” 
those who reside in Athens (sc. from those who do not), he strips Leukon, the 
ruler of Bosporos, and his sons of the grant that you have given them.
73 Harpokration distinguishes between a “visiting alien” and a metic who has “es-
tablished a household for himself ” (s.v. μετοίκιον): μέτοικος μέν ἐστιν ὁ ἐξ ἑτέρας 
πόλεως μετοικῶν ἐν ἑτέρᾳ καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὀλίγον ὡς ξένος ἐπιδημῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἴκησιν 
αὐτόθι καταστησάμενος. ἐδίδοντο δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔτος δραχμαὶ ιβʹ, ὅπερ 
ὠνόμαστο μετοίκιον (“A metic is one who changes residence from one city to another, 
and not briefly visiting as a foreigner but having established residence there. There used 
to be given by them each year twelve drachmas, which had been called the metoikion”). 
Jones 2003: 157–60 has shown that the verb ἐπιδημεῖν “almost never” conveys “a notion 
of residence, and never an implication of time, or of a long or short stay” (157) and is 
usually best translated as “visit.” Legally speaking, Athens could require any visitor to 
register as a metic, which is to say resident, once s/he had been present on the ground 
long enough. As Aristophanes of Byzantium framed it, “Whenever (an alien) exceeded 
the established period (of default ateleia at Athens) he became, forthwith, a metic,” which 
is to say resident in law (Nauck 38: ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβῇ τὸν ὡρισμένον χρόνον, μέτοικος ἤδη 
γίνεται καὶ ὑποτελής· παραπλησίως δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἰσοτελής). Harpokration may simply 
have conflated two senses of “residence,” (1) abode and (2) legal status; with passage of 
time a visiting alien simply became a resident regardless of his abode.
74 Dem. 20.29: ἔτι δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, διὰ τὸ γεγράφθαι ἐν τῷ νόμῳ διαρρήδην αὐτοῦ 
‘μηδένα μήτε τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε τῶν ἰσοτελῶν μήτε τῶν ξένων εἶναι ἀτελῆ,’ μὴ διῃρῆσθαι 
δ’ ὅτου ἀτελῆ, χορηγίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου τέλους, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς ‘ἀτελῆ μηδένα πλὴν τῶν ἀφ’ 
Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος,’ καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ ‘μηδένα’ πάντας περιλαμβάνειν τοὺς ἄλλους, 
ἐν δὲ τῷ ‘τῶν ξένων’ μὴ διορίζειν τῶν οἰκούντων Ἀθήνησιν, ἀφαιρεῖται καὶ Λεύκωνα τὸν 
ἄρχοντα Βοσπόρου καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐτοῦ τὴν δωρειὰν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἔδοτ’ αὐτοῖς.
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The ban, Demosthenes urges, will offend one of Athens’s most important al-
lies. Now, Leukon was a naturalized citizen (Dem. 20.30) and so not subject 
to rules governing grants to aliens, whether resident at Athens or not. But 
Demosthenes also seems to object to Leptines’ sloppy absolutism, which 
omits to acknowledge the wide variety of forms and terms that grants of im-
munity could take, ignores the fact that awards may apply to some tele but 
not to others, and fails to distinguish immunities that were conditional on 
residence from those that were not. Such distinctions were important, for as 
Rubinstein notes, “[d]espite the impression of uniformity given by the bulk 
of attested ateleia grants, there was considerable variation between individual 
awards, not just between different communities but even between the grants 
issued by a single polis.”75
But all recipients will have been either resident or not; all awards will have 
been conditional on residence or not. When Athenians thought about taxation, 
whether liability or immunity, they thought about residence. Thus, a proposal 
to enhance ateleia that was granted on condition of residence might need to 
answer whether it would exclude holders of simple unqualified ateleia, and 
a proposal to extend unconditional ateleia might draw cautious requests to 
specify whether the naked exemption would include grants that were tied to 
residence. We might have preferred a tidier expression: “All holders of ateleia, 
whether conditional or not ....” But the Greek as we have it reflects the two 
basic formats known to Athenian legislation. Now, Antikles granted immunity 
to both groups, just as Leptines took it from both, but Antikles could not be 
charged with failing to draw the obvious distinctions. Rather he made it clear 
that Athens granted immunity at Chalkis to (1) anyone who had received 
ateleia on condition of Athenian residence, and (2) anyone who had received 
ateleia that was not limited by any such condition. If Athens liked a person 
and showed it, Chalkis was required to do the same.
The clause was an infringement on Chalkis’s ability to tax aliens within 
its borders. But which taxes? Telos embraced a lot.76 Here, Gauthier thought 
it denoted tribute; Whitehead and Balcer, an essentially unidentified tax; 
Vinogradov and Pébarthe, commercial and import/export taxes; Giovannini, 
liturgies. Ostwald preferred a broader formulation, “civic obligations,”77 rightly 
75 Rubinstein 2009: 115–16, 120–26, quote at 126.
76 On telos and other fiscal terminology see Chankowski 2007.
77 Whitehead 1976: 256; Balcer 1978: 70; Vinogradov 1973; Giovannini 2000; Pébarthe 
1999: 142–46 and 2005; Ostwald 2002: 140. On varieties of ateleia see Rubinstein 2009; 
Henry 1983: 241–61. Of a different time, place, and phenomenon, but invaluable: Gauthier 
1991. On Athenian grants of ateleia for “trade-related services” see Engen 2010: 187–92.
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I think. Even in formal utterance Athenians were content to speak simply of 
tele. When vetting a candidate selected for office the boule asked him, τὰ τέλη 
<εἰ> τελεῖ.78 This was not a fossilized reference to the Solonian tele, nor is it 
likely to have meant liturgies alone: service was not a prerequisite to office. The 
question was not ambiguous, but broad, testing whether a candidate “fulfills” 
what he must.79 The clause in the decree on Chalkis was, I suggest, similar 
in spirit,80 not intended to extend one variety of exemption or another, but 
rather whichever Athens had granted in any given case. If Athens had awarded 
a person ateleia at Athens from liturgical service, or eisphora, or whatever,81 
then the same was to apply at Chalkis.
78 [Ath. Pol.] 55.3: ἐπερωτῶσιν δ’, ὅταν δοκιμάζωσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ‘τίς σοι πατὴρ καὶ 
πόθεν τῶν δήμων, καὶ τίς πατρὸς πατήρ, καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητρὸς πατὴρ καὶ πόθεν 
τῶν δήμων’; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ Ἀπόλλων Πατρῷος καὶ Ζεὺς Ἑρκεῖος, καὶ ποῦ 
ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά ἐστιν, εἶτα ἠρία εἰ ἔστιν καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα, ἔπειτα γονέας εἰ εὖ ποιεῖ, [καὶ] τὰ 
τέλη <εἰ> τελεῖ, καὶ τὰς στρατείας εἰ ἐστράτευται (“And whenever they perform scrutiny 
they ask first, ‘Who is your father and from which deme is he, and who is the father of your 
father, and who is your mother, and who is the father of your mother and from which 
deme is he?’ Afterward, whether he has an Apollo Patroios and Zeus Herkeios and where 
these shrines are; next, whether he has family tombs and where these are; then, whether 
he treats his parents well, and whether he pays his tele and whether he has performed 
military service”).
79 Rhodes 1993: 618 on [Ath. Pol.] 55.3 observes that Din. 2.17–18 shows that the phrase 
refers to taxation rather than Solonian tele: here, the question εἰ τὰ τέλη τελεῖ is answered 
in the negative with τῶν δ’ ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων εἰσφερόντων ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, οὗτος οὐδὲ τῶν 
δημοσίων καὶ ὧν ὦφλεν τὸ ἀργύριον ἅπαν ἐκτέτεικεν (“And while other Athenians con-
tribute from their own resources, he has not even paid all the money for the public debts 
that he owed”). Also, citing Onom. 85–86, Rhodes notes that Pollux “or an intermediary 
must have seen here a reference not to payment of taxes but to membership of a Solonian 
property-class;” for Pollux, the questions were εἰ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσιν ἑκατέρωθεν ἐκ τριγονίας, 
καὶ τῶν δήμων πόθεν, καὶ εἰ Ἀπόλλων ἔστιν αὐτοῖς πατρῷος καὶ Ζεὺς ἕρκιος, καὶ εἰ τοὺς 
γονέας εὖ ποιοῦσι, καὶ εἰ ἐστράτευνται ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ τίμημα ἔστιν αὐτοῖς 
(“whether they are Athenians on both sides for three generations back and from which 
demes, ... whether they have timema”), But if Pollux thought of τίμημα in the sense of 
“outstanding debt” or “fine” or “payment,” so that the question simply asked whether 
candidates “had any debts (to the polis) outstanding” (but note the definite article, τὸ), 
then he need not have thought the question a reference to the Solonian tele at all. His 
understanding need not have differed much or at all from Dinarchus’s.
80 Similarly, on the broad array of obligations indicated by ateleia see MacDowell 2004. 
81 I assume that such immunities as resulted automatically from service (protections 
against the burden of back-to-back service) fell outside the intended scope of the clauses. 
But who knows what a nominee might have found worth arguing in a Chalkidian court?
291Tax Exemption and Athenian Imperial Politics: The Case of Chalkis
The provision will have made it attractive for parties who were honored 
friends of Athens, whether resident there or not, to engage in business or 
other activities in Chalkis. Economically, this was a narrower exception than 
has long been thought. It did not extend immunity at Chalkis to all metics at 
Athens, but only to individuals who already possessed the benefit at Athens, 
a much smaller group. The measure did not supersede Chalkis’s right to tax 
aliens on its soil; nor, for that matter, did it prevent Chalkis from granting 
immunities to anyone it desired. It did, however, allow Athens to declare to 
certain of its friends that Chalkis was open—to them anyway—for business, 
at the very agreeable tax rate of zero.82 By asserting the right to grant a civic 
privilege that was to be binding not only in Athens but also in one of its sub-
ject cities, Athens infringed not only on Chalkis’s fiscal self-determination, 
but also on its political autonomy. The logic here is nearly identical to that 
of Archestratos’s rider, which introduced a novel83 infringement on Chalkis’s 
judicial autonomy: Chalkis was to be free to enjoy the right of euthyna over 
Chalkidians, except in the most severe cases, over which Athens claimed ju-
risdiction; all other cases were to proceed as usual (IG I3 40.70–79). So also, 
Chalkis was to be free to tax as it saw fit, except in the case of one highly visible 
group, namely those to whom Athens had already granted the privilege of 
immunity at Athens; all others were to pay taxes as usual. The one provision 
was a judicial infringement, the other fiscal. Both protected Athens’s friends 
and imperial prerogatives, while curtailing Chalkis’s autonomy in particular 
instances—probably few but certainly high-profile. These interventions were 
tough but not ruinous,84 more likely demeaning than debilitating.
82 Engen 2010: 188, 189 suggests that Athenian grants of ateleia were economically 
costly to Athens, but that Demosthenes was right to observe “that the chief benefit of 
ateleia for its receipients was honorific rather than monetary” (190). This seems to sug-
gest that immunities cost Athens a lot but were worth only a little to the recipients; the 
opposite ought to have been true. Engen suggests further that grants of ateleia awarded 
to those engaged in commerce “degraded traditional social values by honoring those who 
performed trade-related services on par with some of the most highly honored political 
and military benefactors in Athenian history” (188); also, “the monetary cost” of grant-
ing ateleia “for Athens paled in comparison to the deleterious effect that granting it to 
foreigners for trade-related services would have had on traditional social values” (190). 
Some Athenians did on occasion show open dislike for those engaged in commerce, but 
I don’t understand the mechanism by which honoring such businessmen “degraded 
traditional social values,” or what that would mean.
83 Lewis 1992: 131–32.
84 Forsdyke 2005: 219 argues that the decree on Chalkis shows a moderate, even gener-
ous, Athens: “the fact that the Athenian councilors and jurors swore to the Chalcidians 
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***
So much for what the clauses did. When and why? The decree on Chalkis “is 
almost universally agreed” to belong to 446/5 b.c.e.85 The chief reason is that 
Thucydides and others report that in the same year the Euboians revolted from 
the Delian League and were swiftly brought to heel by Perikles (n1 above). But 
Mattingly has marshaled an array of evidence to suggest that the document 
belongs to 424/3.86 The details are too many and complex to enumerate in 
their entirety, but some of the salient features are as follows87: Philochoros 
tells us that Athens campaigned against Euboia in the archonship of Isarchos 
(424/3).88 The Archestratos who proposed the rider at IG I3 40.70–80 could 
well be identified with the man of the same name who proposed riders at 
IG I3 73.9–16, 39–44 (ca.424–410). The Hierokles responsible for overseeing 
sacrifices at IG I3 40.64–67 is very likely the Hierokles attested in Aristophanes 
(Peace 1047–1119) and Eupolis (Cities 212) and active in the 420s. The legal im-
position of Athenian jurisdiction over capital cases arising in subject cities (IG 
I3 40.71–76) otherwise seems to be an innovation of the 420s. The awkwardly 
proleptic relative clause at IG I3 40.45–47 is paralleled in Attic epigraphy only 
at IG I3 76.30–32 (422/1) and 82.17–18, 29–30 (421/0). Introductory ἀγαθῆι 
τύχηι (IG I3 40.40) first appears at Athens (in epigraphy and drama) in the 
420s. Besides these, Mattingly musters a wealth of circumstantial evidence 
from fifth-century literature and epigraphy. Moreover, Lawton has observed 
that acceptance of Mattingly’s lower dating for this and three other decrees 
means that the sculptural form of the Attic document relief is unattested 
before the 420s, which “would accord well with what we know of sculptural 
that all cases of death, exile, and disenfranchisement would be judged by regular legal 
procedures under the auspices of the Athenian people brings this oath into line with 
those sworn by these same bodies to the Athenian citizens themselves. Substantively and 
symbolically, the Athenians therefore placed the Chalcidians on a par with their own 
citizens, extending to the Chalcidians privileges that were central to their own conception 
and practice of democratic citizenship.” 
85 Ostwald 2002: 136.
86 On the impact of his arguments—with regard to this text and others—see recently 
Papazarkadas 2009; Rhodes 2008. 
87 See Mattingly 1961 [=1996: 53–67], with reiterations and enhancements at 2002, 
1992; also 1996: 161–62, 247, 372–77, 391–94; recently 2010b, esp. 102–4.
88 FGrH 328 F130 [Σ Ar. Vesp. 718]: τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν δύναται καὶ αὐτὰ συναίδειν ταῖς 
Διδασκαλίαις· πέρυσι γὰρ ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἰσάρχου ἐστράτευσαν ἐπ’ αὐτήν, ὡς Φιλόχορος. 
See also FGrH 328 F119.
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practice in Athens at this time.”89 Knoepfler has added palaeographic support 
for the later date of the related IG I3 39.90 Papazarkadas has observed that the 
leniency of the Chalkidian oath might better reflect an Athenian role as in-
termediary in an episode of Chalkidian stasis, and that a jibe in Aristophanes 
(Eq. 236–37) seems to characterize Chalkidians as primed—in 424 b.c.e—for 
revolt (2009: 73–74). 
Why, then, should we prefer 446/5? As Papazarkadas observes, “the ma-
jor problem in downdating the Chalcis decree was, and continues to be, 
Thucydides’ silence” about the campaign in 424/3.91 For Moreno, such an 
omission would constitute “impossible perversity.”92 But Thucydides was 
89 Lawton 1992: 251; Balcer 1978: 84–88, suggested that the stele was accompanied by 
a relief; Lawton 1992: 249 does not agree: IG I3 40 is absent from Lawton 1995, where her 
63 and 64 are now often held to belong to the 420s.
90 Knoepfler 2001: 73; finding also in the action of 424/3 a possible explanation for a 
passage in Pausanias: Bull. épigr. 2011: 314.
91 Papazarkadas 2009: 74. Though persuaded by many of Mattingly’s lower dates and 
rightly anxious lest an early IG I3 40 become “an isolated case floating in an inscriptional 
vacuum” (73), he cautions that “[t]here is, however, not much point in isolating specific 
clauses that might strengthen the lower dating of the Chalcis decree: the process could 
go on for ever. We can only conclude that an Archidamian War context is not out of the 
question” (74).
92 Moreno 2007: 100n114: “One would need to assign impossible perversity to 
Thucydides in failing to record a large expedition to Euboea, especially given his own clear 
belief in the island’s importance to Athens (esp. in 8.95–6, but elsewhere in his own work 
from 1.114 on). The expedition is missing from Thucydides simply because it was relatively 
minor: it was probably recorded by Philochorus as no more than a reinforcement of the 
forts securing the island, intended to stem the tide of allied rebellion after Delium and 
Amphipolis.” But Thucydides regarded Euboia’s revolt of 446/5 as an opening moment 
to the war: 1.23.4; 1.87.6; 2.2.1. His narrative of 411 suggests that the Euboian revolt of 
that year was another critical watershed. Athens’s democracy was imperiled, and Euboia 
its last hope; now, revolt there caused terror at Athens that surpassed that generated by 
the Sicilian disaster(!); Thuc. 8.95.2; 8.95.7–8.96.2 (note the similarity between 8.95.7, 
Εὔβοιάν [τε] ἅπασαν ἀποστήσαντες πλὴν Ὠρεοῦ (ταύτην δὲ αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον) 
καὶ τἆλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν καθίσταντο (“They moved all of Euboia to revolt, except for 
Oreos [the Athenians themselves were occupying it] and they arranged the rest concern-
ing it [Euboia]”), and 1.114.3, καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι πάλιν ἐς Εὔβοιαν διαβάντες Περικλέους 
στρατηγοῦντος κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογίᾳ κατεστήσαντο, 
Ἑστιαιᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον] (the Athenians “overran the whole island, 
and they arranged the rest under an agreement but after expelling the people of Histiaia 
occupied the land themselves”). Yet, Athens still managed to dissolve the Four Hundred 
(8.97.1). An historian keen to frame a narrative bookended by two critical Euboian revolts, 
one on the eve of war (446/5) and one in 411, might wish to downplay an intervening 
revolt. Such a wish might not have been “perverse.”
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silent about many things,93 and his silence here cannot preclude the later date 
unless it proves that Philochoros was wrong to write of Athens’s military ac-
tion in Euboia in 424/3. But it can do no such thing on its own and no one 
has found independent cause to reject his testimony. Thucydides’ silence was 
never a compelling argument against the lower date.
If we accept the lower date then we must account for IG I3 39, which pre-
serves a scrap of what looks to be an oath to be taken by Eretrians, which is 
nearly identical to the one preserved at IG I3 40 and so seems to belong to the 
same episode.94 Though he has tended to date IG I3 39–41 together,95 Mattingly 
acknowledged in at least one place that IG I3 39’s palaeographical similarities 
to IG I3 10 and 55 mean that it probably ought to fall before the Archidamian 
War.96 Jameson, however, put IG I3 10 “not much earlier than 420,”97 and 
Knoepfler has shown that 39 is in fact palaeographically at home in the last 
93 One need not accept all of the arguments advanced by Badian 1993 to appreciate 
that Thucydides cannot have mentioned all events that we think he ought to have found 
significant. Thucydides’ silence has not kept the late date for IG Ι3 21 (426/5) from prevail-
ing: see Mattingly 2010b: 99–100 and 100–102 on Thucydides and the three-barred sigma.
94 IG I3 39: [ – – – ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπεδώσω Ἐρε|τρι]εῦσιν̣ [πει]θ̣[ομένοις τῶι δήμωι τῶι 
Ἀθην|αίω]ν· ὁρκῶσα[ι] δ̣[ὲ πρεσβείαν ἐλθõσαν ἐξ Ἐρε|τρί]α̣ς μετὰ τῶν ὁ[ρκωτῶν 
Ἀθηναίος καὶ ἀπογρ|άψαι] τὸς ὀμόσαντας· ὅπ̣[ως δ’ ἂν ὀμόσωσιν ἅπαν|τες] ἐπιμελόσθ[ω]ν̣ 
οἱ στ̣[ρατηγοί· κατὰ τάδε | αὐτ]ὸς ὀμόσαι· οὐκ ἀποσ̣[τήσομαι ἀπὸ τõ δήμ|ο τ]õ Ἀθηναίων 
οὔτε τέ[χνηι οὔτε μηχανῆι οὐδ|ε]μ̣ιᾶι οὐδ’ ἔπει οὐδὲ [ἔργωι οὐδὲ τῶι ἀφισταμ|έν]ωι 
πείσομαι, καὶ ἐὰ̣[ν ἀφιστῆι τις κατερῶ | Ἀθ]η̣[να]ίοις, καὶ τὸν φ̣ό̣[ρον ὑποτελῶ τοῖς 
Ἀθην|αίοις ὃ]ν̣ [ἂν] πείθω [Ἀθηναίος – – – ]; IG I3 40.14–27: ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπ̣|[ε]δόσο 
Χαλκιδεῦσιν πειθομένοις τõι δέ|[μ]οι τõι Ἀθεναίον. hορκõσαι δὲ πρεσβεία|[ν] ἐλθõσαν 
ἐχ Χαλκίδος μετὰ τõν hορκοτõ|ν Ἀθεναίος καὶ ἀπογράφσαι τὸς ὀμόσαντ|ας. hόπος δ’ ἂν 
[ὀ]μόσοσιν hάπαντες, ἐπιμελ|όσθον hοι στ[ρ]ατεγοί vacat | κατὰ τάδε Χαλκιδέας ὀμόσαι· 
οὐκ ἀπο[σ]τέ|σομαι ἀπὸ τõ [δ]έμο τõ Ἀθεναίον οὔτε τέ[χ]ν|ει οὔτε μεχανε˜ι οὐδεμιᾶι οὐδ’ 
ἔπει οὐδὲ | ἔργοι οὐδὲ τõι ἀφισταμένοι πείσομαι, κ|αὶ ἐὰν ἀφιστε˜ι τις κατερõ Ἀθεναίοισι, 
κ|αὶ τὸν φόρον ὑποτελõ Ἀθεναίοισιν, hὸν | ἂν πείθο Ἀθεναίος.
95 E.g., Mattingly 1996: 162, 176.
96 Mattingly 1996: 514n39. For the Ionic script in IG I3 39 and several other texts see 
Low 2005: 104–9, who suggests that “They exemplify a move towards a style of represent-
ing an interstate relationship in which the power that is being exercised over the allies 
is not, straightforwardly, Athenian kratos, reaching out beyond the boundaries of Attica 
and overtaking everything in its path. What is represented is, instead, a more subtle, ho-
mogenizing approach to the construction of power, in which Athens is not so much the 
enforcer of an Athenian way of life as a facilitator of some wider, perhaps Panhellenic, 
relationship” (108). On Ionic script see recently Matthaiou 2010: 13–18.
97 Jameson 2000–3: 29.
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quarter of the fifth century.98 As for the very poorly preserved provisions for 
Histiaia (IG I3 41), perhaps they seem better suited to Athens’s assumption of 
control in 446/5, but they could belong to either time. Anyway, whatever the 
date of IG I3 39 and 41 (and I am inclined to keep them together with 40, and 
all three late), in 424/3 Euboia was a piece of unfinished business for Athens. 
In fact, it was a recurring challenge, almost as old as Athens’s democracy. 
In 506 b.c.e, in retribution for an assault on Attica, Athens met and defeated 
the Boiotians on their side of the Euripos and crossed over to Euboia, where 
they bested the Chalkidians too and left behind 4000 cleruchs on the land 
of the wealthy hippobotai. They bound and ransomed the captives, and then 
dedicated the chains on the Acropolis. With a tenth of the ransom Athens 
commissioned and dedicated a tethrippon on the Acropolis, on the left as one 
approached the propylaia, accompanied, Herodotus tells us, by an epigram 
(Hdt. 5.77.2–4.). We know the epigram also from two inscribed copies, one 
thought to have been produced with the monument shortly after 506, the 
98 Knoepfler 2001: 73. It may be worth observing that the sole internal indication that 
IG I3 39 concerns Eretria per se is a single doubtfully read letter, the alpha at the start of 
line 4: [ – – – ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπεδώσω Ἐρε|τρι]εῦσιν̣ [πει]θ̣[ομένοις τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθην|αίω]ν· 
ὁρκῶσα[ι] δ̣[ὲ πρεσβείαν ἐλθõσαν ἐξ Ἐρε|τρί]α̣ς. Schweigert 1937: 318, thought that, “the 
fracture of the left edge of the fragment near line 4 clearly follows the right hasta of a letter 
like A, Λ, or Δ.” Neither the photograph accompanying his publication, nor the image 
at Low 2005: pl.5, nor the squeeze taken by Balcer, now at Ohio State University (http://
drc.ohiolink.edu/bitstream/handle/2374.OX/506/IG%20I%283%29%2039.jpg), nor the 
squeeze in the collection of the Oxford Centre for the Study of Ancient Documents (a 
digital image of which C. Crowther has kindly shared with me), appears to show any trace 
of an alpha, or indeed anything else, before the final sigma in  Ἐρε|τρί]α̣ς. This is worrisome. 
I wonder whether IG I3 39 records an oath taken by a Euboian city on some other occasion; 
Chalkis might fit: [ – – – ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπεδώσω Χαλ|κιδ]εῦσιν̣ [πει]θ̣[ομένοις τῶι δήμωι τῶι 
Ἀθην|αίω]ν· ὁρκῶσα[ι] δ̣[ὲ πρεσβείαν ἐλθõσαν ἐχ Χαλ|κιδ]ὸ̣ς (Boris Chrubasik has very 
kindly confirmed that his own examination of the CSAD squeeze and the stone itself led 
him to conclude that an alpha did not precede Σ at the start of line 4). But what would 
this mean? Could it be that IG I3 39 was produced in the aftermath of the Periklean action 
in 446/5 and IG I3 40 after that of 424/3, the latter seeking to reaffirm what Athens had 
already “arranged,” introducing some new measures and, at least in the case of hostages, 
leaving some things “as decreed” previously (IG I3 40.49: κατὰ τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα)? IG I3 
39 would in this case represent an early instance of Ionic script at Athens, but such seem 
to be known; for a recent, interesting discussion of possible implications see Low 2005: 
105–9. The extreme similarity of two oaths separated by more than twenty years inclines 
me to think not. But in any case, the ground appears to be less stable here than we have 
thought and it seems safe to say that IG I3 39 might not have contained an oath taken by 
Eretria, whatever its date.
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other in the mid fifth century.99 Long after the event, the chains, statue, and 
epigram reminded all who mounted the acropolis of that occasion on which 
Athens “extinguished the hybris” of the Boiotians and Chalkidians, even if 
the Athenians could not, in Aelian’s later formulation, “extinguish their anger 
against Chalkis.”100 In 446/5, Athens’s victory of 50 years prior was still a fresh 
memory. And two decades later, the events of 446/5 were as well. Whatever 
the precise causes of action in 424/3, around that time Aristophanes had his 
mind on Athens’s earlier Euboian victory. Bdelykleon laments distributions 
of Euboian wheat, which were promised but never materialized; instead, 
Athenians barely got barley, and only if they could prove citizenship!101 We 
know from Philochoros that this was Egyptian barley, delivered the year after 
the victory over Euboia (whose defeat perhaps wasn’t the alimentary bonanza 
99 IG I3 501A and B [= Raubitschek 1949: nos.168, 173]: [δεσμõι ἐν ἀχνύεντι(?) 
σιδερέοι ἔσβεσαν hύβ]ριν ⁝ / παῖδε[ς Ἀθεναίον ἔργμασιν ἐμ πολέμο] / [ἔθνεα Βοιοτõν 
καὶ Χαλκιδέον δαμάσαντες] ⁝ / τõν hίππος δ̣[εκάτεν Παλλάδι τάσδ’ ἔθεσαν]; B: [ἔθνεα 
Βοιοτõν καὶ Χαλκιδέον δαμά]σαν[τες] / [παῖδ]ες Ἀθεναίον ἔργμα̣[σιν ἐμ πολέμο] / 
[δεσμõι ἐν ἀχνύεντι(?) σιδερέοι ἔσβε]σαν [hύβριν] / [τ]õν hίππος δεκ̣ά̣τ̣[εν Παλλάδι τάσδ’ 
ἔθεσαν]. Also Diod. Sic.10.24.3; Anth.Pal. VI 343; Aristid. 49.380 [Jebb]; P.Oxy. XXXI 2535; 
Const. Porph. De Sententiis 105 [p.299 Boissevain]. The monument seen by Herodotus 
(and also apparently Pausanias 1.28.2) was probably a replica, the Persians presumably 
having taken or demolished the original: Mattingly 1982: 383–84 suggests restoration in 
the 470s. Berti 2010 supports the old suggestion that the Battle of Oenophyta (in 457) 
was the occasion. Palaeography, in particular the appearance of three-bar sigma, inclined 
Raubitschek 1949: 203–5 no.173, to favor ca.456. I cannot see how this is any more likely 
an occasion than Athens’s victory in 446/5. On this monument and the “Euripos epitaph” 
see Anderson 2003: 151–57.
100 Ael. VH 6.1.1: Ἀθηναῖοι κρατήσαντες Χαλκιδέων κατεκληρούχησαν αὐτῶν τὴν 
γῆν ἐς δισχιλίους κλήρους, τὴν Ἱππόβοτον καλουμένην χώραν, τεμένη δὲ ἀνῆκαν τῇ 
Ἀθηνᾷ ἐν τῷ Ληλάντῳ ὀνομαζομένῳ τόπῳ, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν ἐμίσθωσαν κατὰ τὰς στήλας 
τὰς πρὸς τῇ βασιλείῳ στοᾷ ἑστηκυίας, αἵπερ οὖν τὰ τῶν μισθώσεων ὑπομνήματα εἶχον. 
τοὺς δὲ αἰχμαλώτους ἔδησαν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα ἔσβεσαν τὸν κατὰ Χαλκιδέων θυμόν. I 
leave aside the well-covered ground of credibility of Aelian’s account or whether he has 
conflated the episodes of 506 and 446/5; see recently Zelnick-Abramowitz 2004: 330–35.
101 Ar. Vesp. 715–18: ἀλλ’ ὁπόταν μὲν δείσωσ’ αὐτοί, τὴν Εὔβοιαν διδόασιν / ὑμῖν καὶ 
σῖτον ὑφίστανται κατὰ πεντήκοντα μεδίμνους / ποριεῖν· ἔδοσαν δ’ οὐπώποτέ σοι πλὴν 
πρώην πέντε μεδίμνους, / καὶ ταῦτα μόλις ξενίας φεύγων ἔλαβες κατὰ χοίνικα κριθῶν 
(“Whenever they are afraid they give you Euboia and promise to furnish you grain in 
fifty-medimnoi increments. But so far they’ve given you nothing except, just now, five 
medimnoi—and that you just barely got, after escaping charges of being a foreigner—of 
barley, by the choinix”).
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for Athens that it may have been promised to be?), and that the requirement to 
prove citizenship went badly for thousands.102 Strepsiades observes, while sur-
veying the earth, that Euboia was “stretched on the rack by us and Perikles.”103 
It is tempting to take this literally: by us, just recently, and by Perikles, back in 
446/5. In any case, the diachronic perspective is clear. It would be one thing 
for Aristophanes to make hay out of the recent campaign, but to do so in a 
way that so powerfully looks back to the revolt of 446/5 suggests that recent 
events were regarded as both non-trivial and bound up in the prior military 
action—like an American observing the United States’ “victory” in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom by joking about its “victory” in Operation Desert Storm.
This later Euboian campaign took place in a period in which Athens’s exten-
sion of ateleia seems to have become more common, or at least more visible 
to us. In 424/3 Athens decreed honors, including ateleia, for Potamadoros and 
his son Eurytion,104 who are thought to have been among the democrats just 
exiled from Orchomenos (Thuc. 4.76.3). In this same period Athens seems 
to have granted Proxenides of Knidos immunity from “the other tele” but not 
from what the Knidians pay in tribute,105 and Mattingly speculates that the 
Boiotian exiles recognized in IG I3 72 “were probably given as wide a form of 
ἀτέλεια in 424/423”—an attractive, if unprovable, idea (1996: 61). He suggests 
even that some of these privileged exiles may have taken the opportunity to 
settle in Euboia. It was perhaps in 424/3 that Athens honored Herakleides of 
102 FGrH 328 F119 [Σ Ar. Vesp. 718].
103 Ar. Nub. 211–13: Μα. ἡ δέ γ’ Εὔβοι’, ὡς ὁρᾷς, / ἡδὶ παρατέταται μακρὰ πόρρω 
πάνυ. / Στ. οἶδ’· ὑπὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν παρετάθη καὶ Περικλέους (Student: And right here 
Euboia, as you see, is stretched out quite far. Strepsiades: I know, for it was stretched out 
by us and Perikles”). Σ Ar. Nub. 213 [FGrH 328 F118]: Περικλέους δὲ στρατηγοῦντος 
καταστρέψασθαι αὐτοὺς πᾶσάν φησιν Φιλόχορος, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ἐπὶ ὁμολογίαι 
κατασταθῆναι, Ἑστιαιέων δὲ ἀποικισθέντων αὐτοὺς τὴν χώραν ἔχειν (“Philochoros says 
that when Perikles was strategos they overran the whole island, and that while the rest 
was arranged by agreement, they took the territory of Histiaia after it was colonized”). 
The scholiast’s phrase closely resembles Thuc. 1.114.3 (n92 above).
104 IG I3 73.9–11: Ἀρχ[έστρατος εἶπε· τὰ μὲν ἄλλα | καθάπερ τε˜ ι βο]λε˜ ι, ε῏ναι δὲ 
[Ποταμοδόροι – 10 – ]|[ – 12 – ] ἀτέλε[ιαν]; Mattingly 1996: 56, suggested that this 
Archestratos may be the same as the man who proposed the rider at IG I3 40.70–79.
105 IG I3 91.24–27: ἄλλον δὲ ἀτελὲς ἔστο, τὰ] | δὲ τέλε τ[οῖς ἐγλογεῦσι τελέτο hὰ] | δεῖ 
Κνιδ[ίος ἐς τὸμ φόρον τελε˜ν κα]|θάπερ hο[ι ἄλλοι Κνίδιοι. The restorations are owing 
to Meritt 1939: 65–69, and are based on sense rather than exact parallels (69). Walbank 
1978: 346 no.64 finds them convincing. No one seems to have challenged them. Matthaiou 
2010: 18–19 notes that many texts in IG I3 are “over–restored.”
298 Joshua D. Sosin
Klazomenai with ateleia.106 It is tempting to see in this approach to rewarding 
individuals and groups with honors that included some form of tax-immunity 
an early expression of what we find more often in the fourth century. One 
thing, at least, is clear: such rewards are sparsely attested in the fifth century 
and more common in the fourth so that the later the date of the decree on 
Chalkis the less exceptional its approach to ateleia for aliens. 
And it does make sense already, I suggest, in the economic and political 
landscape of the 420s. Christ has suggested that the antidosis mechanism, 
which we might think of as conferring court-ordered exemptions, emerged 
some time between the 450s and 430s; the procedure seems mature by the 
420s and cannot have functioned as we know it before the emergence of the 
dikasteria (1996: 159–60). This introduction of a formal mechanism by which 
exemptions might be claimed and substitutions proposed may have been an 
attempt, Christ suggests, to prevent wealthy elites from securing unfair ex-
emptions for themselves and their friends. We cannot know for certain, but 
this same period saw increasing pressure on elite wealth elsewhere in the “tax” 
system: however we understand the famously ambiguous clause of Thucydides, 
it does not seem likely that Athens introduced eisphora much—if at all—before 
428.107 In this period, Aristophanes could have the demagogue Kleon threaten 
to ruin a man by putting him down for eisphora, the so-called Old Oligarch 
could bemoan courts clogged with challenges to liturgical liability, and not 
much later Ischomachos could be said to have joked to Socrates that no one 
ever called him kalos k’agathos when challenging him to antidosis.108 Athens 
was honing its controls on access to elite wealth, through the popular courts, 
and devising new tougher means of extracting revenues, which were not open 
to court-sanctioned exemption. It was also a period in which complaints about 
these developments seem to have become more public, more vocal. This is 
106 IG I3 227+II2 65 (SEG XXXII 10) lines 19–22: ε῏ναι Ἡρακλε|ίδηι] γῆς ἔγκτησιν κα[ὶ 
οἰκίας Ἀθήνησι|ν καὶ ἀ]τέλειαν καθάπ[ερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πρ|οξένο]ις, where restore καθάπ[ερ 
τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοι]ς per Knoepfler 2001: 57–58. But τοῖς ἄλλοις worries; cf., e.g., IG II2 
10.9 (401/0): ἐ]γγύησιν καθάπε[ρ Ἀ]θηναίοις; IG II2 109.b.20–21: [ἰ]σοτέλειαν καθάπ|ερ 
Ἀθηναίοις; 174.b.4–5 (405/4): κ[αὶ τὰ ἄλλα καθάπερ Ἀ]|θηναίος; 287.5–6 (before 336/5): 
καὶ τὰ τέλη τελεῖν καθάπ|ερ Ἀθηναῖοι. Space permitting, ἰσο]τέλειαν καθάπ[ερ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
Ἀθ|ηναίοι]ς, or εὐ|εργέτα]ις seem not unattractive. On the date see Walbank 1983; ac-
cepted by Reiter 1991: no.43. But for doubts see Mattingly 1996: 523–24 with citations; 
Harris 1999; Culasso Gastaldi 2004: 47–54. 
107 Christ, 1996: 162. Thuc. 3.19.1: καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε πρῶτον ἐσφορὰν 
διακόσια τάλαντα.
108 Ar. Eq. 912–26; Xen. [Ath. pol.] 3.4; Xen. Oec. 7.3.
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nothing new, but a familiar story of waxing popular power in the 420s, rooted 
at least partly in judicial control.
The decree on Chalkis fits nicely into this well known narrative. Ostwald 
has rightly called attention to its emphasis on “the Athenian people” (2002: 
137). Under the decree’s terms Athenians swore to punish no Chalkidian with 
exile, devastation, disfranchisement, exile, arrest, execution, or confiscation, 
without trial, without consent of “the Athenian people” (ἀκρ̣ίτο οὐδενὸς ἄνευ 
τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθ|εναίον), and to abide by these and other constraints, provided 
that Chalkidians obey “the Athenian people” (4–16). The Chalkidians were to 
swear not to revolt from “the Athenian people” (21–22), to aid and defend “the 
Athenian people” if anyone injures “the Athenian people” (29–31), and to obey 
“the Athenian people” (31–32). Antikles’ provisions on aliens at Chalkis, more-
over, excepted those who had been granted ateleia “by the Athenian people” 
(54–55). Now, while the Chalkidians were also to denounce revolutionaries 
“to the Athenians” (24–25) and pay “to the Athenians” whatever tribute they 
persuaded “the Athenians” to accept (25–27), the emphasis on allegiance and 
obligation to the demos per se is striking, perhaps even pushy.109
The courts and the people were the backbone of Athenian democratic 
power, so that the vow to abstain from punishments without trial,110 “with-
out consent of the demos,” has the ring of a slogan.111 The injunction against 
109 IG I3 40.4–16: οὐκ ἐχσελõ Χα|λκιδέας ἐχ Χαλκίδος οὐδὲ τὲν πόλιν ἀνά|στατον ποέσο 
οὐδὲ ἰδιότεν οὐδένα ἀτιμ|όσο οὐδὲ φυγε˜ι ζεμιόσο οὐδὲ χσυλλέφσο|μαι οὐδὲ ἀποκτενõ οὐδὲ 
χρέματα ἀφαιρέ|σομαι ἀκρ̣ίτο οὐδενὸς ἄνευ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθ|εναίον, οὐδ’ ἐπιφσεφιõ κατὰ 
ἀπροσκλέτο | οὔτε κατὰ τõ κοινõ οὔτε κατὰ ἰδιότο οὐδ|ὲ ἑνός, καὶ πρεσβείαν ἐλθõσαν 
προσάχσο | πρὸς βολὲν καὶ δε˜μον δέκα ἑμερõν hόταν | πρυτανεύο κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. 
ταῦτα δὲ ἐμπ̣|[ε]δόσο Χαλκιδεῦσιν πειθομένοις τõι δέ|[μ]οι τõι Ἀθεναίον; 21–22: οὐκ 
ἀπο[σ]τέ|σομαι ἀπὸ τõ [δ]έμο τõ Ἀθεναίον; 29–32: καὶ τõι δέμοι Ἀθεναίον βοεθέσ|ο καὶ 
ἀμυνõ, ἐάν τις ἀδικε˜ι τὸν δε˜μον τὸν | Ἀθεναίον, καὶ πείσομαι τõι δέμοι τõι Ἀθ|εναίον; 
54–55: καὶ εἴ τοι δέδοται h|υπὸ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεναίον ἀτέλεια; 24–27: κ|αὶ ἐὰν ἀφιστε˜ι 
τις κατερõ Ἀθεναίοισι, κ|αὶ τὸν φόρον ὑποτελõ Ἀθεναίοισιν, hὸν | ἂν πείθο Ἀθεναίος.
110 The injunction against execution without trial seems also to have appeared in the 
bouleutic oath, [Andoc.] 4.3, some core of which likely comes from 501/0, as Ath. Pol. 
22.3 gives; but this particular provision is generally held to have followed the coup of 403; 
see Forsdyke 2005: 219. For the earlier phrase, ἄνευ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεναίον πλεθύοντος, 
found at IG I3 105.34–35, 35, 40–41, which belongs to the period of Athens’s “codifica-
tion” of laws, but preserves regulations on the boule generally thought to belong to the 
early decades of the democracy, see Ryan 1994. For discussion see Ostwald 1986: 31–40. 
111 The two notes are perhaps sounded together elsewhere in Attic epigraphy in a heav-
ily restored treaty between Athens and Siphnos, from the mid fourth century (Agora XVI 
50.9–13): [.....]τ[..· Ἀθηναῖον δὲ τὸν δῆμον | τ]ὸ[ν] Σιφνίων [μὴ κτένεν ἄνευ τõ] | δήμο τõ 
Ἀθηναίων̣ [μηδὲ διώκεν]· | ὣς δ’ ἂμ μηδὲς ἀποθ[άνηι Ἀθηναί|ω]ν, ἄκριτος, ἀντις[ – 12 – ]. 
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punishment without consent of the Athenian people appears in two Athenian 
proxeny decrees of the 420s.112 Moreover, when just a few years later the 
Mytilenian Euxitheos stood trial at Athens for a homicide alleged to have 
been committed abroad he strikes a similar chord. He reminded the jury that 
“not even a polis can punish a man with death without the consent of the 
Athenians”113 and that “if it is possible for a slave to testify against a free man 
in a homicide trial, and for a master—if he decides to—to sue on behalf of 
his slave, and if there can be a jury vote, just the same, for one who has killed 
a slave and one who has killed a free man, then it was surely reasonable that 
there be a jury vote concerning him [a slave witness] as well, and that he not 
It is often suggested, e.g., Forsdyke 2005: 213–14, and Ryan 1994: 125, that both ἀκρ̣ίτο 
οὐδενὸς and ἄνευ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθ|εναίον refer to the popular courts. I do not wish to 
claim anything broad about the semantic overlap of demos, ekklesia, and dikasterion; see, 
e.g., Hansen 1983 [=GRBS 19 (1978) 127–46] and 1989 [=C&M 40 (1989) 101–6]. But I 
am inclined to agree with Blanshard 2004: 31–34, esp.32, on the “gap” between jury and 
demos that this text suggests. The provision cannot have barred X, Y, and Z, “without trial, 
i.e., without consent of the popular courts.” As Blanshard observes, the one was not a 
gloss on the other. Furthermore, unless we regard ἀκρ̣ίτο οὐδενὸς as applying only to the 
immediately preceding promise not to seize a person’s assets (8–9), which scarcely seems 
likely, then one of the actions Athenians swore to forego “without trial, without consent of 
the people” was civic devastation (5–6), which Athenian juries did not impose. The Greek 
simply insisted that extra–judicial punishment could not be imposed without consent of 
the people; this was a check. Ἀκρ̣ίτο οὐδενὸς modifies the preceding injunctions (in the 
genitive owing to proximity of ἀφαιρέ|σομαι), and ἄνευ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθ|εναίον modifies 
the union set. Any punishment that was not sanctioned by the courts would have to be 
approved by the people, which must mean the popular assembly. When the speaker of Lys. 
22 observed that some members of the boule recommended remanding the sitopolai to the 
Eleven for execution “without trial,” but that he preferred a jury trial “in accordance with 
the law,” he was not, I suggest, stating that a jury trial was compelled by law (and thus that 
execution without one was illegal), but that he preferred to pursue one, as allowed by the 
law; he was boasting moderation, not the avoidance of illegality (22.2); Carawan 1984: 
118 argues that by the second half of the fourth century such executions were illegal, “a 
familiar anachronism, still on the books, but noteworthy only as a legal curiosity” (121). 
True or not, that was decades after the decree on Chalkis.
112 IG I3 70.5–7 (420s): – – – δὲ μὴ | ἐ]ξεῖναι ζημιõν [ – – – ἄνευ] | τõ δήμο τõ Ἀθηνα[ίων; 
on the date: SEG XXXVI 6. IG I3 65.20–22 (ca. 427/6): [καὶ] μὲ ἐχσε˜ναι αὐτὸν | [μεδεν]ὶ 
ζεμιõσα̣[ι ἄν]ε̣υ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεν|[αίον. Gerolymatos 1987. This was proposed and passed 
via rider moved moved by an Antikles (7–8, Ἀντικλ̣[ε˜ς εἶπε), who may well have been the 
same man who proposed the second decree on Chalkis (IG I3 40.40): Mattingly 1996: 56. 
113 For a putative generic rule on this, as well as Archestratos’s rider, see Balcer 1978: 
102–18 and esp. 119–42.
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have been killed by you without a trial.”114 Now, Euxitheos did not claim 
the necessity of consent of “the people of Athens,” but here was the son of a 
Mytilenian who was somehow involved in the recent oligarchical revolt,115 
who was arguing that his trial before a popular court, rather than the more 
conservative Areopagos, was illegal and unfair (Antiph. 5.8–19)! Caution was 
in order. And so Antiphon had Euxitheos underscore the validity of Athens’s 
jurisdictional claims, but also celebrate the power and importance of the popu-
lar courts with language that, to judge by its appearance in three contemporary 
decrees concerning Athens’s obligations to its friends and allies (IG I3 40, 65, 
70), recalled a topical, current, popular catchphrase. He was not referring to 
the decree on Chalkis per se but to a wider cultural conversation of which 
it was a part.116 It is a telling contrast that around 453/2 Athens compelled 
Erythraians to swear allegiance under a different, less popular, banner.117
114 Antiph. 5.47: νῦν δὲ αὐτοὶ καταγνόντες [τὸν] θάνατον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπεκτείνατε· ὃ 
οὐδὲ πόλει ἔξεστιν, ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι; 48: εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ μαρτυρεῖν 
ἔξεστι δούλῳ κατὰ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου τὸν φόνον, καὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, ἂν δοκῇ, ἐπεξελθεῖν ὑπὲρ 
τοῦ δούλου, καὶ ἡ ψῆφος ἴσον δύναται τῷ δοῦλον ἀποκτείναντι καὶ τῷ ἐλεύθερον, εἰκός 
τοι καὶ ψῆφον γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἦν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτον ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν.
115 Euxitheos protests that his father was not found to be involved in the revolt (Antiph. 
5.77), that inasmuch as he had been involved he had acted under compulsion (79), and 
perhaps most enigmatically, that he had left Mytilene for Thrace not because of any 
wrongdoing but in order to avoid sycophants (78). True or not (we cannot know), this 
sounds like special pleading; χωροφιλεῖν was rare, this very passage earning comment 
by Poll. Onom. 13.
116 In other, slightly later, contexts of political factionalism, the phrase seems to insist 
on reference to the assembly, or at least not to the courts: Rhodes and Osborne 17.3–11 
(ca.386): μὴ ἐξεῖνα[ι τ]|ῶν στρατηγῶν διαλλάξαι | μηθενὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πό|λει ἄνευ τοῦ 
δήμου τõ Ἀθη|ναίων· μηδὲ τῶμ φυγάδων, ο|ὓς ἄν ἐξελάσωσιν Ἐρυθρα|ῖοι, μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι 
κατά|γειν ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ἄνευ τοῦ | δήμου τοῦ Ἐρυθραίων; SEG LIX 101.11–13 (387/6): 
καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τῶν στρατηγ[ῶν μηδενὶ τ]|οὺς φεύγοντας κατάγειν ἄνευ τοῦ δή[μου τοῦ 
Κλαζομε]|νίωμ μήτε τῶμ μενόντωμ μηδένα ἐξελ[αύνειν.
117 IG I3 14.26–29: [(presumably) οὔτ’ | ἄλλο]ι πείσο̣[μ]α̣[ι τõν ἐς] Μέδος φ̣ε[υ]γ̣ ό[ντο]ν 
ἄνευ τε˜̣[ς] β̣ο[λε˜ς τε˜ς | Ἀθε]ναίον καὶ τõ [δ]έ̣μο [ο]ὐδὲ τõν μενόντον ἐχσελõ [ἄ]ν[ευ] τε˜̣ς 
β̣[ο|λε˜ς] τ̣ε˜ς Ἀθεναίον καὶ [τõ] δ̣έμ̣ο; compare in the same text 21–24: β̣ολεύσο hος ἂν 
[δύ]νο[μ]α̣[ι] ἄρ̣ι̣στ[α κα|ὶ] δ[ι]κα[ιότα]τα Ἐρυθραίον τõι πλέθει καὶ Ἀθεναίον καὶ τõν 
[χσυ]|νμά[χ]ον [κ]αὶ οὐκ [ἀποσ]τέσομαι Ἀθεναίον τõ π[λ]έθος οὐδὲ [τ|õν] χσυνμάχον 
τõν Ἀθεναίον. See also IG I3 48.15–23 (439/8): δρ|άσο καὶ ἐρõ καὶ βολεύσο τõι δέμοι τõι 
Ἀθενα|ίον hό τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν κ]αὶ ἀγαθόν, [οὐδὲ ἀ|ποστέσομαι ἀπὸ τõ δέμο τõ 
Ἀ]θεναίον οὔτε λ[ό|γοι οὔτε ἔργοι οὐδὲ ἀπὸ το˜ν] χσυμμάχον το˜ν Ἀ|[θεναίον, καὶ ἔσομαι 
πιστὸς τ]õι δέμοι τõι Ἀθ|[εναίον· Ἀθεναίος δ’ ὀμόσαι· δρ]άσο καὶ ἐρõ καὶ | [βολεύσο 
καλὸν τõι δέμοι τõι] Σαμίον hό τι ἂν | [δύνομαι. Would that we knew more about the 
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The 420s was a period in which questions of who was liable to Athenian 
taxation, who was not, and how one decided, were in the air, a hot topic; 
Athens was honoring friends with immunity, creating conditions under which 
its citizens could compete to shift burdens from themselves to their peers, 
and developing a new levy that was not subject to such agonistic trading. 
Complaints arose. Popular power was growing, thanks in large part to skillful 
use of the popular courts.118 The Athenian decree on Chalkis, with its emphasis 
on popular power and fair judicial process via the authority of the demos and 
dikasteria, with its legal innovation (Archestratos’s rider) and its attention to 
rewarding and cultivating friends with thoughtfully framed immunities, is 
entirely at home in this period. It makes sense. Still, it is hard to infer motives 
from the content and tone of any decree, even where we think we know some-
thing about its proposer. But in IG I3 40 we have two decrees and one rider, 
and we know virtually nothing about their framers. As to the precise goals of 
the measures on liability and immunity at Chalkis, we can only speculate. In 
a climate of increased popular control over the assignment of liturgical duty, 
holders of immunities might find it difficult or embarrassing to insist upon 
their validity. Perhaps old elites and profit-minded metics who were reluc-
tant to play by the new rules, or perhaps uneasy with the prospect of leaving 
their liability in the hands of a jury, found in recent events an opportunity 
to enact legislation that would allow them to quit the city and never have to 
pay taxes again. Or perhaps this was a democratic gambit meant to shed the 
most intransigent rich and pressure more moderate resisters to acquiesce, an 
poorly preserved and imprecisely dated IG I3 157+213 (440–410): μ̣[ὲ] ἐχσέστο μ[εδενὶ – 10 
–]|[.] προσ[κ]αλε˜σθαι Ἀθέ̣[ναζε ἄνευ τε˜ς β|ο]λε˜ς ἒ τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθε[ναίον μεδὲ μεδ|έν]α 
ἐγμα̣ρτυρõν αὐτõ[ι. The pairing of boule and demos here in contexts quite similar to the 
one found in the decree on Chalkis, from but a few years earlier, makes it likely, I suggest, 
that the people in both formulas were the assembly, and not a jury court. See n111 above. 
118 The long, clearly complicated, and very badly preserved Athenian provisions for 
Histiaia (IG I3 41) are challenging to square with historical circumstances of one period 
or another. It might be worth noting, however, that its numerous provisions concerning 
judicial and legal process would not be out of keeping with a date in the 420s. Such a date 
would also suggest obvious meaning to the tantalizing bit preserved at line 38: – – – δὲ 
χρ̣εμάτον ἐσφο[ρᾶς – – –; if eisphora commenced in 428 and this text dates to 424/3, then 
we need no other definition for this phrase; if the text belongs to 446/5, then we do not 
know what this “contribution of money” was, not that the phrase alone proves anything. 
See Mattingly 1996: 162–63. A similar phrase is found at IG I3 21.56 (περὶ τõν χρεμάτον 
τε˜ς ἐσφορᾶ[ς), for which Mattingly’s later date 426/5 is now accepted: Rhodes 2008: 503; 
Papazarkadas 2009: 71–72.
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expression of a democratic ideology that applied to both citizens and metics: 
if you want to stay, you have to pay to play. Or something altogether different. 
But whatever the precise political or economic purpose(s) of the clauses 
on taxation of aliens at Chalkis—and we may never know—they left Chalkis 
free to set its own tax policy, except in the case of individuals to whom Athens 
had already extended the privilege of ateleia, whether conditional on resi-
dency or not. They were a clear assertion of Athens’s role as chief arbiter of 
honor: whomsoever Athens treats to immunity, so shall Chalkis. And so says 
the grammar. I urge that this interpretation is agreeable to a date of 424/3. 
But whatever the date, the measure itself was a slap in the face, not a punch 
in the gut.
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